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The purpose of this thesis is to provide a flexible
guide for the project manager, to be used in the prepara-
tion of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) presentation. The authors have emphasized factors
which relate to the non-technical aspects of the presenta-
tion because they believe knowledge of these characteris-
tics will substantially aid the project manager. Technical
considerations which comprise the framework of any project
are also included, but only from a broad viewpoint. Speci-
fic detail was avoided because each DSARC review will have
its own areas of emphasis. Therefore, the authors consider
that a discussion and compilation of the non-technical and
technical factors, which this thesis accomplishes, will
provide the project manager a base from which to direct
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The review conducted by the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC) at key system decision points in the
acquisition process is held for the purpose of ensuring
that the service has a viable program and is ready to pro-
ceed to the next phase of acquisition. It is the responsi-
bility of the project manager to provide the DSARC with the
pertinent information it needs to make its recommendations
regarding the program to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(DEPSECDEF) . The DEPSECDEF then makes the key system de-
cision (proceed, modify, or cancel) based in part on the
DSARC's recommendation. This high level decision hinges on
the effective, impressive, and knowledgeable presentation
by the project manager. He must use all the facilities
available to him to prepare for the DSARC.
The initial concept of this thesis was to develop a
checklist to assist a Navy project manager in his prepara-
tion of a DSARC presentation. This concept evolved because
the Navy does not use an official checklist in preparing
for a DSARC and in the early stages of thesis research the
authors considered such a checklist to be an important tool
for use by a project manager.
After a significant period of research the development
of a "cook-book" type of checklist was deemed inappropriate
because of the variability with which the DSARC must

consider each program and each key system decision; a de-
tailed, specific checklist had little meaning. It was still
considered, however, that a set of basic guidelines, i.e.,
a flexible guide, was needed by the Navy project manager.
Further research indicated that the technical aspects
of the DSARC presentation were considered in Air Force and
Army checklists, but these often immersed themselves in de-
tail and did not address the non-technical considerations in
the preparation of a DSARC presentation. Any key system
decision is a high level problem which involves behavioral,
legal, political, and other non-technical considerations as
well as the technical ones. These considerations all
directly affect defense management and decision-making. The
project manager's presentation will be more effective if he
is aware of the importance of knowing how to improve group
inter-action through effective communication. This is accom-
plished by possessing a knowledge of the groups involved,
the background for decision-making, and the effects of est ib-
lished procedures.
The authors concluded that a flexible guide which
emphasized the non- technical aspects of a DSARC presentation
and generalized the technical aspects would provide the
greatest assistance to a project manager, in any service, in
his preparation of a DSARC presentation. This thesis pro-
vides the project manager such a guide.
For the purpose of this thesis, the DSARC review is con-
sidered to be the review conducted just prior to any one of

the three key system decisions addressed in DOD Directive
5000.1, i.e., program initiation, transition to engineering
development, or transistion to production. This generaliza-
tion is made specifically to emphasize the level of decision-
making and to de-emphasize the detail pertinent to individual
key system decisions.
After presenting a brief history of defense decision-
making and describing the evolution of the DSARC process,
the methods currently used by the services in preparing for
a DSARC review are discussed. Then the authors' considera-
tions resulting from: (1) personal interviews with DOD per-
sonnel, (2) the analysis of existing checklists and (3) the
study of current directives are presented with the intention
of showing why knowledge of these considerations is necessary
in preparing for a DSARC.
The final chapter of the thesis is a synoptic presenta-
tion of the considerations discussed previously; organized
in a form which can be readily utilized by the project
manager in fulfilling his responsibility for DSARC evolu-
tions .

II. EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
f .*
ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL
A. PRE-DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
1 . Evolution of the Decision-Making Process
Prior to 1947, decisions regarding defense procure-
ment rested primarily with the two executive departments
associated with defense, the Department of War (Army and
Army Air Corps) and the Department of the Navy (Navy and
Marine Corps). Since their problems were in distinctly
different operational areas and were of different magnitude,
these two departments worked independently with little co-
ordination regarding system acquisition.
As technological capabilities increased and the
world environment, with increased international tension,
became more complicated, any decision, regarding which de
fense system to develop, became more constrained by
.-.•••. political considerations than had previously been the cas .
•-
-
— Before World War II the United States followed a
policy of strategic mobilization. This policy evolved into
one of deterrence because there existed the capability of
massive retaliation and, later, controlled response sup-
ported by nuclear and conventional forces-in-being. Differ-
ences of opinion arose between the services where areas of
;.
**• responsibility concerning strategic operations overlapped.
Also, technological advancements outpaced the organizational
and management capabilities of the individual armed services
10

and the military departments could not resolve the conflicts
that developed. A change in organization and management was
needed
.
The need for a change resulted in Congress passing
the National Security Act of 1947 which established a new
level of coordination above the services. Secretary cf War
Henry L. Stimson had proposed a single unified military de-
partment. Secretary of the Navy James F. Forrestal opposed
unification and had proposed a new management layer over the
two existing military departments. Authority of the new
level of management, suggested by Secretary Forrestal, was
limited to coordination. The National Security Act of 1947
followed primarily the views of Secretary Forrestal.
The National Security Act of 1947 established three
executive departments, The Department of the Air Force, the
Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy. The
Secretaries of the three executive departments became, by
law, members of the President's cabinet and the National
Security Council. . The Act did not create a Department of
Defense; the three executive departments were called the
National Military Establishment. The Head of this organiza-
tion, however, was called the Secretary of Defense, and he
was limited to the exercise of general authority, direction
and control. The Secretaries of the three military depart-
ments held the powers not specifically delegated to the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was
11

designated the principal assistant to the President in all
matters relating to national security.
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal became the first
Secretary of Defense and it was his responsibility to de-
velop the organization which he had proposed. The follow-
ing two years of work with the original organization
indicated that the Defense establishment still needed fur-
ther refinement. Secretary Forrestal proposed to President
Truman a change which instituted major milestones in the
evolution of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense
Secretary Forrestal's proposal resulted in the National
Security Act Amendments of 1949.
The amendments redesignated the National Military
Establishment as the Department of Defense and established
it as an executive department of the government. The Secre-
tary of Defense was provided with full statutory authority
for directing and controlling his department. The Secre-
taries of the Army, Navy and Air Force lost their cabinet
status and the Secretary of Defense's authority and respon-
sibility was increased.
In 1953 President Eisenhower expressed his concept
of the role of the Secretary of Defense when he said that no
DOD function was independent of the Secretary of Defense.
Further legislation, the Reorganization Act of 1958
and an Executive Order in 1961, increased the responsibili-
ties of the Secretary of Defense and provided him with the
necessary power for carrying out his assigned responsibili-
ties. The Secretary of Defense now had the authority to
12

consolidate, transfer, reassign or abolish functions involv-
ing common/ similar services or supplies, even though such
functions had been established by statute. The President,
in his Executive Order of 1961, delegated to the Secretary
all the functions including the powers, duties and authority
contained in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The
above changes finally placed the Secretary of Defense in a
powerful position as principal assistant to the President in
all matters relating to the Department of Defense.
A system had now evolved where the Secretary of
Defense decided what course of action to pursue. This was
a complete alteration of the pre-1947 concept where the
armed services made the decisions regarding defense acquisi-
tion. Now, one man, working with his staff and the ser-
vices, coordinated all efforts with respect to providing a
system to meet the nation's needs.
2 . Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Involve -
ment in the Decision-Making Process
Despite the organizational changes in the Departmf it
of Defense, prior to the introduction of significant policy
changes by former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
(1961 - 1967), OSD involvement in the system acquisition
decision-making process was largely that of loosely monitor-
ing service initiated programs with little input, other than
administrative, into actual decision-making.
Charles J. Hitch, in a lecture delivered at the
University of California in April 1965, stated, "although
13

we have no had unification 'in name' for almost 18 years,
there was little unification 'in fact' until 1961, except
in three areas...." These three areas were: (1) unified
commands, (2) joint contingency plans and (3) putting con-
trol of the overall level of the defense budget into the
hands of the civilian Secretaries by dividing the total de-
fense budget ceiling among the three military departments.
This left, to each department, the allocation of its budget
among its own functions, units and activities.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, immersed in
its own problems of organization and operation, provided no
overall coordination between functions, military and civil-
ian. Each of the four primary assistants to the Secretary
of Defense had his own sphere of responsibility and often
did not have time to concern himself with the problems of
others. These four assistants to the Secretary of Defense
were the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, DDF
& E; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), ASD
(COMPT) ; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and
Logistics), ASD(I&L); and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis), ASD(SA).
"The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
is the principal advisor and staff assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense in the fields of scientific and technical
matters; basic and applied research; research, development,
test and evaluation of weapons, weapons systems and defense
'
, A Modern Design for Defense Decision, A McNamara -
Hit ch-Enthoven Anthology (Washington, D. C., Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 1966), p. 51.
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material; and design and engineering for suitability, pro-
ducibility, reliability and maintainability. He supervises
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Secretary of Defense (Installation
principal staff assistant to the
n fields of material requirements;
d scheduling; acquisition, inventory
aintenance, distribution, movement
al, supplies, tools and equipment;
; transportation, petroleum, and
ces; supply cataloging, standardiza-
ol; commercial and industrial acti-
military construction, including
ies; family housing; real estate and
ng general purpose space; and
He is also responsible for assess-
of resources to attack damage and
1 emergency planning.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (System Analysis)
reviews, for the Secretary of Defense, quantitative require-
ments including forces, weapon systems, equipment, personnel,
and nuclear weapons. He assists the Secretary in the
initiation, monitoring, guiding, and reviewing of require-
ments studies and cost-effectiveness studies, and encourages
the use of the best analytical methods throughout the Depart-
ment of Defense. In addition, he conducts or participates .,
in special studies as directed by the Secretary of Defense."
The above "job descriptions" emphasize the prodi-
gious responsibility assigned to each principal assistant
'
, Department of the Navy RDT&E Management Guide ,




to the Secretary of Defense. It is not surprising that
each would be involved in his own functions and not ini-
tiate an involvement with the problems of others. Prior
to the McNamara era it appeared that OSD had the respon-
sibility of monitoring the services in the acquisition
of defense systems but was unsure of how to manage this
responsibility.
The policy changes of former Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara changed but, according to many DOD
personnel, did not appreciably improve the situation re-
garding coordination and cooperation between the services
and OSD. Under McNamara the decision-making process be-
came centralized at the OSD level. It lacked the quali-
ties of participative management expected by the services.
Secretary McNamara made all major decisions and apparently
3
overmanaged the services to a great extent. The acquisi-
tion of major defense systems was still undertaken, but
the brunt of a decision often rested on the results of
systems analysis. The defense system acquisition process
continued to lack the overall coordination between functions
[DDR&E, ASD(COMPT), ASD(I&L) and ASD(SA)] necessary for an
4
effective and efficient process.
Jack Raymond, "The McNamara Monarchy," American Defense
Policy , Second Edition, (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore,
1968), pp. 406-412.
The reader may acquire further information on this subject
by referring to the text of A Modern Design for Defense
Decision
, op . cit .
16

In 1969 the Office of the Secretary of Defense came
under new management, Melvin Laird, as Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) and David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense
(DEPSECDEF) . Secretary Packard was tasked with the responsi-
bility of improving the defense systems acquisition process
while Secretary Laird remained concerned with the diplomatic
aspects of the defense department. It was at this time
that procedures were put together which had an unequivocal
impact on defense system acquisition. The impact of this
is discussed later under Section B of this chapter.
3 . Service Involvement in the Decision-Making Process
In this section the involvement of the armed ser-
vices in the systems acquisition decision-making process
is discussed. It is the responsibility of the military
services to procure defense systems as approved by the
Secretary of Defense. This responsibility has always been
assigned to the services. Based on this defined responsi-
bility, service involvement in the decision-making process
has been and should continue to be one of initiation,
marketing and managing their programs.
The services are organized with specific commands
assigned exact functions for accomplishing procurement.
The Army and the Navy both operate using a Material Command
for systems acquisition. Under the Army Materiel Command
there are seven commodity commands and one test and evalua-
tion command. The Navy utilizes six system commands under
17

its Material Command for acquisition purposes. The Air
Force assigns the research and systems acquisition function
to the Air Force Systems Command and the logistics function
to the Air Force Logistics Command. The primary purpose
of the services' material acquisition commands is to
develop, procure and support defense systems.
Establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947
did not have a significant effect on service decision-mak-
ing. The services, to a large extent, functioned indepen-
dently in carrying out their responsibilities in systems
acquisition. The services were still tasked with the over-
all responsibility of system procurement. The monitoring
of service procedures and efforts by personnel in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense did not impact upon service
procedure
.
Mr. McNamara, when he assumed the position of Secre-
tary of Defense, felt that he should become intimately in-
volved in all decisions. To achieve this involvement, Mr.
McNamara utilized his Systems Analysis office. Since Mr.
McNamara's specialty was statistical control his avidity for
systems analysis was natural. Some authors infer, as men-
tioned by McNamara himself, that his system analysis per-
sonnel took much of the decision-making responsibility,




Raymond, £p_. cit . , p. 408
A Modern Design for Defense Decision , ojp_ . cit . , p . 16.
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Nor did he always follow the services' advice in matters of
service interest. This may have been. However, the efforts
of the McNamara era did result in some coordinated service
endeavors. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) was a major McNaraara/Hit ch innovation which contri-
buted significantly to this coordination.
Defense system acquisition, when Mr. Laird and
Mr. Packard arrived in 1969, was overly centralized. One
of the effects was low service morale. The new Secretary
of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense believed in a
participatory style, of management and gradually restored
much of the decision-making responsibility and enthusiasm to
the services. This new management style established the
beginning of a dramatic reorganization in systems acquisi-
tion. The genesis of this reorganization was DOD Directive
5000.1.
B. DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
1 . Development of the Directive
Prior to the actual issuance of DOD Directive
5000.1, two particularly significant memoranda were issued
by DEPSECDEF Packard. These memoranda became the basis
for much of the mechanism and policy used in the final
directive. The first was the 30 May 1969 Memorandum,
Establishment of a Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council (Appendix A), which resulted from Mr. Packard's
initial review of system acquisition management in the
19

Department of Defense. The importance of this memorandum
is discussed under Section C of this chapter entitled
"The DSARC".
The second memorandum, dated 28 May 1970 Policy
Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition (Appendix B)
,
was written after a year's study of the acquisition pro-
cess by Mr. Packard and his staff. This memorandum set the
final tone for the issuance of the DOD Directive 5000.1.
New policy guidance in this memorandum concerned system
acquisition management, conceptual development, full-scale
development, production, and contracts. In addition, the
decentralization of management in systems acquisition was
emphasized
.
Management policies addressed in the 28 May 1970
Memorandum were aimed primarily at the utilization and
recognition of talented people in the systems acquisition
process. Improved procedures for the selection, training,
use, and recognition of project managers, in particular,
were addressed as means of upgrading acquisition managemei t
within the services.
The development policy change brought forth in the
28 May 1970 Memorandum emphasized the use of trade-offs.
The effective use of practical cost, schedule, and perform^
ance trade-offs, i.e., operating requirements and engineer-
ing design trade-offs, was delineated as the most important




New policy in conceptual development was stressed
because wrong decisions made during the conceptual phase
of development are particularly difficult to overcome later
in the program. Three suggested methods of reducing techni-
cal uncertainty in the conceptual phase were risk assessment,
system and hardware proofing, and performance, cost and
schedule trade-offs.
Full-scale development policy changes concerned
themselves with careful planning for risk reduction, mile-
stone planning to demonstrate achievement of objectives,
and timely planning for all matters necessary to implement
a fully operating system.
The emphasis of production policy changes was
directed at the following: (1) completed engineering design,
(2) major problem resolution and (3) demonstration of readi-
ness for production by performance testing to the greatest
possible extent.
Possibly the most significant change from previous
policy noted in the 28 May 1970 Memorandum concerned con-
tracting. Total package procurement which basically shifts
program risk to the contractor, had been tested to a limited
extent and had failed. New policy dictated that the type
of contract be tailored to the risk involved. Cost reimburse-
ment contracts were recommended for advanced and full-scale





2 . Content of che Directive
With two major building blocks in the new Laird-
Packard acquisition process established, the DSARC and
significant new acquisition policy, the formal document,
DOD Directive 5000.1 (Appendix C), was issued. This docu-
ment restated the policy previously established and went
into greater detail in delineating the responsibilities
of OSD and the DOD components. Additionally, a more de-
tailed description of program considerations was included
These considerations were (1) a statement of the system
need in operational terms and its repeated challenging,
(2) consideration of cost parameters to include acquisi-
tion and life-cycle costs, (3) logistic support, (4) use
of milestones, (5) assessment of technical uncertainty,
(6) increased use of test and evaluation, (7) contract
form consistent with program characteristics, (8) source
selection considerations and (9) use of realistic
management information-program control requirements.
C. THE DSARC
Mr. Packard took a major step in reorganizing the
DOD approach to system acquisition by establishing the
Defense System, Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
through the 30 May 1969 Memorandum. Rather than total




system, a purely formal management and decision-making
procedure, a process of systematic adversary management
9
was instituted to complement the DCP system. The char-
ter for the DSARC included with the 30 May 1969 Memoran-
dum, addressed the mission, functions, composition,
authority, responsibilities and finally the administra-
tion of the DSARC.
Briefly, the mission of the DSARC is to review major
system acquisition programs at appropriate and signifi-
cant milestone decision points to permit coordinated
evaluation and deliberation among senior managers and to
assure that complete and objective recommendations are
given to DEPSECDEF concerning the acquisition of major
S
The DCP evolved over a long period of time and the first
reference to it, per se, is in the 1967 posture statement
of Secretary of Defense McNamara. All OSD references for
the actual preparation of DCPs has been informal. Guide-
lines for its preparation are supplied in service instru
t ions
:
Army - Army Reg. 1000-1 30 June 1972
"Basic Policies for System Acquisition"
Navy - SECNAVINST 5000.1, 13 March 1972
"System Acquisition in the Department
of the Navy"
Air Force - AFSC Pamphlet 800-3, 14 May 1971
"A Guide for Program Management"
i
The authors learned through discussions with key OSD and
service personnel that the DSARC proceedings are of an
adversary nature even though the initial intent of the
DSARC was strictly to coordinate service and OSD efforts
23

systems. The DSARC recommendations are used by the
DEPSECDEF as the basis for his decision regarding program
status .
The functions of the DSARC are basically to review
and evaluate the status of each program just prior to the
following key system decision points: (1) program initia-
tion, (2) transition to full scale development and (3)
transition from development to production. The DSARC con-
sists of the DDR&E, the ASD(I&L), the ASD(COMPT), and the.
ASD(SA). These men are frequently referred to as the
DSARC principals. In addition, other OSD personnel, such
as the ASD(INTELLIGENCE)and the ASD (TELECOMMUNICATIONS )
,
will be involved when the program comes under their cogni-
zance .
The authority and responsibilities delineated in the
DSARC charter include: (1) who chairs DSARC reviews, (2)
who chairs additional reviews and how additional reviews
are called, (3) what programs are to be included in the
DSARC process and (4) what aspects are to be considered
at each of the key system decision reviews.
The DSARC provides the means for a coordinated effort
to solve the problems of defense system acquisition.
During the review, the system project manager brings his
analysis of program considerations to the attention of
the DSARC principals in a 30 to 45 minute presentation.
Examples of these presentations are included as Appendices
24

D and E. A period of discussion follows in which the DSARC
principals ask further questions or present their own argu-
ments for consideration by the other members of the DSARC.
During this discussion, the project manager, with detailed
knowledge of his program coupled with his awareness of the
non- technical aspects, may be drawn upon to clarify the
presentation or the information in the DCP
.
Attendance at the DSARC review, though somewhat flexible,
is generally limited to selected persons. This attendance
is controlled by DDR&E.
Finally, after all the information has been presented
and analyzed, a recommendation, which will significantly




III. SERVICE PREPARATION FOR DSARC PRESENTATIONS
In the previous chapter, the evolution of the DSARC was
discussed. This chapter will discuss the procedures fol-
lowed by the three services in their preparation for the
DSARC.
Appendices D and E are examples of actual DSARC presen-
tations of the Patrol Frigate (PF) Project and the Phalanx
Close-in Weapon System(CWIS) Project, less the sensitive
portions, and are provided to show the reader the approaches
taken by two Navy Project Managers in their DSARC presenta-
tions. Appendix E has, included with the presentation, a
memorandum, signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, which
indicates the decision made by the OSD and the rationale
behind the decision.
A. BACKGROUND
DSARC reviews are held for major and important Depart-
ment of Defense system acquisition programs. Criteria for
the determination of these programs is available in DOD
Directive 5000.1 (Appendix C) . Initiation of the DSARC
process usually begins by the service informing OSD that
it is ready for a DSARC on a particular program; however,
a DSARC may be called at OSD's prerogative whenever OSD
deems it necessary. An example of this type of DSARC re-
view might be when new threat information is learned which
26

would make a defense system acquisition program, previously
vital, now unnecessary, or when a breech of a previously
established threshhold is anticipated.
Prior to the DSARC, the project manager must determine
what issues are relevant to his program, and how he will
discuss them. These issues will vary from program to pro-
gram because each program differs in its purpose and objec-
tives. There are, however, certain specified decision
considerations which the services must address in some
detail. These items are obtained through analysis of DOD
Directive 5000.1, by meeting with the DSARC principals'
staffs and from formal and informal memoranda. The con-
siderations upon which the project manager should base his









At the time of this writing OSD was working on a draft
instruction which would explicitly detail which areas of
interest the services were to present at each DSARC.
Informal liaison with OSD personnel indicates that this
draft instruction is still under study.
These items were obtained from OSD personnel who at the
time of the interview were involved in analyzing the






The DSARC expects each one of the above topics to be
addressed at the level of emphasis determined by the key
system decision at hand. For example, if the key decision
to be made, by OSD is whether to go into production, it is
likely that the risks regarding product development may be
minor in nature and need not be emphasized. However, the
test and evaluation status at this phase in the acquisition
process would be of prime importance. ^JHow the program
manager approaches each of these topics of interest is a
function of program status, and what the project manager
together with his service has obtained through liaison
with OSD. This service liaison with OSD at some level
cannot be overemphasized.
One conclusion arrived at by the authors was that the
DSARC requires the presentation of sufficient detail to
make the correct recommendation but not so much detail
that the main DSARC issues are obscured. It must be
remembered that OSD utilizes the DSARC for high-level
decision-making, and the services must address the issues
of importance to the DSARC. As explained to the authors
by Vice Admiral Eli Reich, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Production, Engineering and Material Acquisition),
28

"Take a pragmatic approach with the DSARC or you are not




The two most significant problems in preparing for
a DSARC review are: (1) determining the issues to address
and, (2) how to address them in a manner acceptable to the
DSARC. Regarding the issues in which the DSARC is inter-
ested, the project manager must obtain them through personal
contact between the services and OSD, either in the form
of memo, phone calls, or actual face-to-face communication.
The second problem becomes difficult because the project
manager may overlook some of the important aspects of the
issues, not because he is unfamiliar with the topics, but
rather because he is too closely involved with the program
and will tend to address his problems vice the DSARC's.
This deep involvement may deter him from the aspects of
the issues which are of real importance to the DSARC.
Both of these areas of concern are dealt with through pre-
DSARC reviews.
The project managers whom the authors were for-
tunate enough to talk with expressed the belief that the
DSARC requires a pre-DSARC review within their own service
12^. ,_.., J , .This philosophy was presented during a personal interview
with Vice Admiral Eli Reich on 3 November 1973, Washing-
ton, D . C .
29

to ensure that all issues are covered. The pre-review
helps to reinforce explanation of the issues obtained from
OSD personnel, provides adversary management within the
service, solidifies program objectives, and will aid the
project manager in presenting the program to the DSARC.
The pre-DSARC review allows senior service per-
sonnel, who have been involved in previous DSARCs, to
critique the project manager's presentation. These reviews
put heavy demands on the project manager's time, but should
guarantee better service credibility at the DSARC because
reiterations improve the presentation.
All three services use this manner of preparation.
An analysis of the respective service instructions indicates
much activity involved in pre-DSARC reviews. The Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Naval Material
chair their respective review groups. The Air Force con-
ducts two reviews prior to the DSARC review: (1) Air Staff
Review chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff (R & D) and,
(2) Joint Secretary of Air Force and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force Review.
Because of the involvement of high level service
personnel, the pre-DSARC review will aid in identifying
13 Some of the project managers with whom discussions were
held during the authors' research trip to Washington,
D. C, November 1972, were S3A (Deputy), PF (Deputy)
and PHALANX CIWS . This pre-review concept is also sup-
ported by Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman III, Deputy





issues and, where necessary, will also ensure that emphasis
14
on important technical detail is considered.
2 . Checklists
The Army and the Air Force have developed checklists
for use by their project managers in preparation for a
DSARC review. The Air Force checklist (Appendix F) covers
the requirements of DOD Directive 5000.1. The Army check-
list (Appendix G) appears to be an expansion of the Air
Force checklist and is extremely detailed regarding the
technical aspects of the program. Examples of this are
electromagnetic compatibility requirements and the descrip-
tion of value engineering provisions. The authors consider
both checklists excellent in the technical sense but un-
balanced in some areas. These checklists are limited in
their scope - they do not address all factors which the
authors consider pertinent in the planning of an effective
DSARC presentation. The checklists give an excellent pic-
ture to the project- manager of what he should know about
his program but do not adequately prepare him for a DSARC
presentat ion
.
The Navy does not use an official checklist because
it considers the interface between the Navy Material Com-
mand and the project managers together with the pre-DSARC
14
For further information on pre-DSARC reviews consult
OPNAVINST 5000.41 dated 15 September 1972
NAVMATNOTE 5000 dated 10 January 1973
Army Regulations 15-14 dated 17 January 1973
Air Force HOI 800-3 (Proposed)
31

reviev/s to be sufficient to identify issues in which the
DSARC is interested. The point made by the Navy was that
the DSARC's interests vary depending upon the program;
therefore, the DSARC could not be prepared for by using a
set of standard specific technical checklists. Broad
guidance may be put into a checklist, but that information
is considered available to Navy project managers through
the pre-DSARC review.
This concept, followed by the Navy, makes the
success of the program depend on the discussions at various
review levels to ensure coverage of all the areas of DSARC
interest. Although the Air Force and Army checklists tend
to get too specific, the lack of a Navy checklist provides
their project managers no initial guidance.
The project manager's presentation effectiveness
becomes a function of the experience level of the reviewers
and, though that aspect is important, without an establit ed
set of guidelines, utilization of the reviewer's knowledj :
is often lost due to personnel transfers.
The authors believe that there should be a base
for the project manager to begin preparing his presentation
for the DSARC, and that a broad set of written guidelines
establish this base. It must be remembered, however, that
This point was made by Admiral Rowland G. Freeman during
a discussion with him during the author's research trip
to Washington, D. C. in November 1972.
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the existence of checklists do not, in themselves, ensure
a good DSARC presentation. The key to an effective pre-
sentation is in the coordination between OSD, the services
and the project manager.
3 . Non- t echni cal Considerations
Available checklists, with the possible exception
of a section on program management, are totally oriented
toward technical details. However, of primary importance,
in the authors' opinion, is that there is more to a DSARC
review than presenting the technical details of the program
The non- te chni cal aspects of the presentation must also be
considered. Tnis point can be made clear by paraphrasing
a comment made to the authors by a high service official,
"All DSARCs are different and the project manager must sell
his program. He must prove himself capable and then tell
the DSARC how the job is to be accomplished."
The project manager best achieves this task by
knowing the issues to be addressed and how the views of
the members of the DSARC are oriented toward his program.
The authors submit that the project manager must be aware
of the following items which do not appear in checklists:
a. THE EFFECT ON THE PROGRAM OF THE DSARC
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR STAFFS
b. THE USE AND EFFECT OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT
PAPER
16 This philosophy was expressed by Dr. Peter Waterman from
the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
for R&D, November 1972.
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c. A FIRM FOUNDATION TO ARGUE FOR THE PROGRAM
d. THE PROGRAM IN RELATION TO AN ENTIRE
MILITARY CAPABILITY
e. THE BUDGET AND FUNDING PROCESS
f. INDISTINCT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS
AFFECTING THE PROGRAM
(1) Visibility and exposure.




These items are addressed in detail in Chapter IV.
C. SUMMARY
All services attempt to speak to the issues of interest
to the DSARC as taken from DOD Directive 5000.1. One of
the questions asked OSD personnel was, "Are the services
well prepared for the DSARC presentation?" The answer
received from all those interviewed was, "Yes."
A good technical checklist may be of some importance
for project managers in their preparation for a DSARC
presentation. The Air Force and Army have provided their
project managers with such checklists. The authors con-
sider these checklists too technically detailed to pro-
perly prepare a project manager for a DSARC presentation.
Contrary to the Navy's viewpoint of not needing a check-
list however, the authors consider a broad set of written
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guidelines covering broad technical requirements and non-
technical considerations important, particularly for the
inexperienced project manager.
Though the pre-DSARC reviews seem to be necessary and
do provide the impetus needed to develop and clarify the
issues and technical considerations desired by the DSARC,
the project manager's efforts in preparing for a DSARC
could only be enhanced by the acceptance and use of a




I V . CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PREPARATION
OF A DSARC PRESENTATION
There are many factors which must be considered by the
project manager in his preparation for a DSARC presentation
These factors may be separated into two categories, general
background factors, which the authors consider to be non-
technical, and specific material, or the technical items
discussed in DOD 5000.1.
The background factors to be discussed in this chapter
were derived and developed largely through discussions with
people involved in the DSARC process such as Mr. David
Packard, who established the DSARC, Mr. E. J. Nucci, the
executive secretary of the DSARC, Vice Admiral Eli Reich,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production Engineer-
ing and Material Acquisition), several persons with an
interest similar to that of the authors of assisting pro-
ject managers in preparing for the DSARC, and several pro-
ject managers who had experienced DSARC reviews or were
preparing for them. These background factors as stated in
part in Chapter III include:
1. The Project Manager's Approach to the DSARC
Presentation
2. The Effect on the Presentation of the DSARC
Principals and their Staffs
3. Use and Effect of the Development Concept Paper
(DCP)
A. A Firm Foundation to Argue for the Program
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5. The Program in Relation to an Entire Military
Capab ility
6. The Budget and Funding Process
7. Indistinct External and Internal Factors Affecting
the Program
8. The Unknown
These factors may not be included specifically in the
DSARC presentation; however, their impact must be understood
and this understanding should provide the project manager
with added insight into the preparation of his DSARC presen-
tation .
Following the discussion of background factors, several
more specific considerations for DSARC presentations are
discussed. These considerations are derived from DOD Direc-
tive 5000.1 and include the following:
f




5 . Program Plans
6. Acquisition Strategy
7. Areas of Major Risk
8. Special Logistic Problems
9. Options Available
Careful consideration and evaluation of the background
factors and the considerations of DOD Directive 5000.1 will
provide a project manager with information for the
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preparation of this DSARC presentation. A more detailed
discussion of these background factors is given in the
following paragraphs.
A. THE PROJECT MANAGER'S APPROACH TO THE DSARC
PRESENTATION
The project manager should be the most important single
source of information regarding his project. However, with
the wealth of information at his disposal, it is possible
for the project manager to focus his attention on detail
during a DSARC presentation and lose sight of the key system
decision and recommendation to be made.
The initial intent of the DSARC, according to former
DEPSECDEF Packard, was not to manage programs, but was to
"...make sure the improved procedures were in fact being
applied to each major project at all stages and to assure
that programs were ready to move into production or the ne:^
stage of development.'
Comparing the considerations of a decision-maker (1)
problem recognition and formulation, including the specifi-
cation of goals, (2) specification of alternative courses of
action, (3) identification of key uncertainties, (4) collec-
tion of relevant data, (5) estimation of the value of alter-
native courses of action, and (6) implementation of the
1
8
alternative chose n --with Mr. Packard's original intent
"Farewell" Report of Former Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard on Defense Management Problems, 7 August
1972.
18Ronald E. Frank and Paul E. Green, Quantitative Methods
in Marketing (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall,
Inc. , 1967 ) , p. 1.
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for the DSARC, it follows that the project manager should
address in his presentation the question of how the service
has accomplished each of the first five, points and how the
service intends to accomplish implementation, if approved.
The project manager must provide the DSARC with infor-
mation regarding his program to show that (1) a requirement
exists, (2) the best possible procedures have been utilized
to evalute alternative courses of action and (3) implementa-
tion has been carefully planned. This will make his presen-
tation more effective in meeting the goals of the DSARC.
B. THE EFFECT ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE DSARC
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR STAFFS
1. The DSARC Principals
At each DSARC presentation, the management capabili-
ties of all the DSARC principals are brought together to
focus their attention on a program decision and to make the
best possible recommendation to DEPSECDEF. The expertise
of each of the DSARC principals should be brought into the
purview of the decision at hand to allow each to effectively
contribute to the DSARC recommendation. At a DSARC presen-
tation, the potential contribution of each of the DSARC
principals is often overlooked by the project manager. For
example, at the program initiation DSARC, DSARC I, which is
research and development oriented and chaired by the DDR
and E, system issues which are less development oriented,
yet which may become significant later in the acquisition
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process, are often overlooked. Additionally, preparation
for production contracting may be overlooked or the plan-
ning of production options to meet unanticipated budget
restrictions may not be discussed.
The project manager should become familiar with
the expertise and personalities of each of the DSARC prin-
cipals, anticipate their interest and involvement in the
decision at hand, and present each one with information to
enable him to contribute effectively to the decision. Each
DSARC recommendation is concerned with the total acquisition
of the system being examined, not just the subop t imizat ion
of the key system decision at hand.
2 . The Principals' Staffs
The staffs of the DSARC principals may affect the
final DSARC recommendation in two ways, (1) by their influ-
ence on the general attitudes of the DSARC principals and
(2) by the direct effect of their analyses.
Since the DSARC principals occupy difficult, time-
consuming management positions, they often receive informa-
tion which is either developed directly by their staffs or
else passes through the staffs. This shaping and filtering
process and close personal contact over a long period of
time can affect, understandably, the attitude of the DSARC
principal with respect to the program, though this effect
may be less noticeable than that of the direct analysis.
Prior to DSARC presentations, the staffs of the
DSARC principals become deeply involved in a detailed
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investigation of the program. During these investigations,
the staffs develop adversary approaches to key system deci-
sions to be used by the DSARC principals at the DSARC review.
This investigation and direct analysis may have a signifi-
19
cant effect on the DSARC principals' final recommendation.
The decentralization of defense acquisition manage-
ment responsibility, emphasized in the Laird-Packard philos-
ophy, attempted to eliminate to the greatest possible extent,
interference in program management by OSD except (1) at key
system decision points, (2) when critical problems arose in
programs, or (3) as directed by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF. This
decentralization appears to have allowed the services to
isolate themselves from the OSD staffs; the OSD staffs are
generally not allowed to "interfere" with the program and
the service is required only to communicate with the OSD
20
staffs in conjunction with DSARC reviews. During discus
sions with project managers and OSD personnel, the author
noticed that there appeared to be hostility toward open
communication rather than an attitude of harmoniously work-
ing toward a common goal.
This lack of open communication acts to the detri-
ment of good service/OSD understanding and often obscures
the real issues to be discussed at DSARC reviews. To avoid
19
Discussions with Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG),
Personnel, Of f ice of ASD(COMPT), 8 November 1972.
20,, Farewell" Report of Former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
op . cit . p . 9 .
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wasting the time of the services and the DSARC principals
and to permit timely DSARC recommendations to DEPSECDEF,
the issues must be clearly understood prior to the DSARC
review. Informal staff discussions, with a goal of main-
taining open communication and understanding, without
interference, could do a great deal to overcome unantici-
pated obstacles. It is important that the project manager
utilize the authority vested in him to open the lines cf
communication or to understand the reasons that his
authority is being restricted and to correct those situa-
tions .
C. USE AND EFFECT OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PAPER (DCP)
The Development Concept Paper (DCP) is a tool used to
insure thorough evaluation of a program at service and OSD
levels of analysis in that it "...represents a good layout
of each program as a whole, and enables the DSARC to see
all factors that should be considered before financial
resources are heavily committed to it. The DCP serves as
a sound basis for deciding whether or not we need the system
and for examining the pros and cons of alternative ways of
21
approaching the development." The original intent of the
DCP as stated in DOD Directive 5000.1 was to
...define program issues, including special logistics
problems, program objectives, program plans, performance
21Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, "Concepts for Improving




• No. 1 (Spring 1971), p. 38.
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parameters, areas of major risk, system alternatives and
acquisition strategy.
After a key system decision is made, the DCP becomes a form
of contract between the service and OSD relating to the
future conduct of the program.
There are proponents within OSD and the services who
insist that prior to every DSARC, the DCP must be updated,
reviewed, and fully coordinated through all DSARC principals
They argue that complete coordination allows all issues to
be effectively analyzed.
The Navy has been criticized for requesting (and receiv-
ing) DSARC reviews prior to completion and review of a pro-
gram's DCP. The Navy argues that prior to the DSARC review,
resolution of issues is not complete on some programs and
the "final contract" cannot be consummated. Further, the
Navy contends that a non-finalized DCP provides the DSARC
more flexibility regarding its recommendation to DEPSECDEF.
At the DSARC review new alternatives can be proposed as a
result of the meaningful interchange between the service
and the DSARC principals. The changes can be entered in the
DCP and significant "coordination" time can be saved.
General guidance within OSD now supports this concept.
Both sides of the question have valid arguments. In
programs where many alternatives exist and agreement is
improbable, the complete coordination of the DCP may not be
realistic prior to the DSARC review. The final determina-
tion regarding whether to request the DSARC key system
A3

decision review with a complete or incomplete DCP will pro-
bably be affected by factors such as decisions by seniors
above the project manager in the chain of command and which
are not under his control. It is, however, incumbent on
him to understand all the reasons for a particular decision,
to weigh them carefully, and to insure that his program's
best interests are indeed being served.
D. A FIRM FOUNDATION TO ARGUE FOR THE PROGRAM
The basic assumptions and needs on which the program is
based may be considered by the project manager as accepted
facts after the first key system decision, DSARC I. This
belief may be erroneous.' The acquisition of a major system
is a dynamic process. Factors that may be relevant at one
point in time may be irrelevant at another time. There
should be DSARC principals or members of their staffs as
well as members of the project manager's staff and personi il
within the sponsoring service who question basic sssumpti as
throughout the acquisition of a system.
If the project manager is to give an effective DSARC
presentation, he must be prepared to cope with "opposition"
to his basic assumptions at all times. An example of the
project manager's need to be prepared for DSARC opposition
occurred during a production decision DSARC for the S3A
carrier-based aircraft program. The project manager assumed
that aircraft carriers would continue to be utilized by the
Navy during the life of the S3A aircraft. The need for and
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continued use of aircraft carriers was questioned at this
DSARC review. This assumption had not been questioned in
pre-DSARC discussions by the OSD Systems Analysis personnel
and the project manager's lack of complete justification
for the assumption, and thus the ability to settle the issue
quickly, caused additional DSARC meetings to be held regard-
ing this fundamental question. Agreement was finally
reached and only then was the production decision recommenda-
tion pursued further.
The project manager must be able to effectively cope
with opposition, whether it is directly related to the
DSARC recommendation at hand or not, if he is to give an
efficacious DSARC presentation. One method of handling oppo-
sition that is not directly related to the decision at hand
is to utilize prepared point papers. Such point papers
could cover a wide range of topics with current justifica-
tion and positions clearly outlined and could be utilized
to "read into the record" the arguments necessary to justify
assump t ions
.
E. THE PROGRAM IN RELATION TO AN ENTIRE MILITARY
CAPABILITY
A conflict of interest arises in the formulation of the
DSARC presentation when the project manager attempts to
view his project from his advocacy role within the service
as well as from the level of the OSD. With the complexities
of system acquisition, the OSD level must be viewed as co-
ordinating the acquisition of many systems to provide the
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nation with a total defense capability. The service project
manager, on the other hand, to adequately perform his job,
must be an advocate for a very small element of that entire
capability
.
There are too few people in DOD who appreciate the
problem of getting a total defense program that makes
sense. The military and civilian participants in
this process must learn to take a larger view and
recognize that the perspective that is appropriate
for the project officer is not one that is appropriate
for someone who is participating in the development of
the total national defense program.^
To overcome the conflict, the project manager must
generalize, in part, his view. In addition to being a strong
advocate for his program, the project manager must consider
his program in relation to the entire military capability of
the nation. This broader view will allow him to relate
more accurately with the goals of the DSARC and to formulate
his presentation at its level.
A broader view on the part of the project manager may
also benefit the service directly. It should allow the
project manager to develop and suggest trade-offs among
service programs and service funds. These may benefit the
service in the long run. When the broader view on the part
of the project manager is generalized to include the analysis
22
Alain C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, "The Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting System in the Department of
Defense: An Overview from Experience" in R. A. Haveman
and J. Margolis, eds., Public Expenditures and Policy




of interservice alternatives among programs and funds, it
should enhance his service's position in the competitive
atmosphere of interservice rivalry at the DSARC level. This
improved position will result because the service will be
in a position to understand alternatives available to it
regarding interservice trade-offs and to utilize those
options to its own benefit.
The problem is for the project manager to retain his
highly motivated advocacy review and at the same time to
broaden his view of how his system fits into the larger
national defense scenario. Obviously he can best overcome
this conflict by being cognizant of national defense objec-
tives and the part his program plays in meeting those
objectives. But even more closely related to his advocacy
status, he must be aware of the programs of his service
and of other services, how they relate to his program, and
what trade-offs are available.
47

F. THE BUDGET AND FUNDING PROCESS
The project manager must be aware of the pervasiveness
and complexity of the budgeting and funding process because
23this system may have several impacts on his program.
Budget changes may occur which force immediate changes
in program plans. To be prepared for potential budget
changes, a listing of priorities for budget cuts among sub-
systems within the program and a means of allocating budget
cuts among that priority listing must be developed. Such a
budget change contingency plan will give the project manager
the necessary information to effectively cope with new alter-
natives which assume various budget changes if they are con-
sidered at a DSARC review. This budget contingency plan
should be utilized by the project manager as background/
support material for his DSARC presentation.
In addition, the timing of DSARC meetings in relation
to the budget cycle may have an impact on program alterna-
tives available. If DSARC reviews are conducted just after






















































































































































Decision Memoranda (PDM) are issued, each service's budget
plan for the following year will be somewhat inflexible
and trade-off alternatives may be largely restricted to
24
in tr a-service trade-offs only. To overcome the incon-
venience of such budget inflexibility, long-range planning
may be required to optimize the timing of a DSARC review
within the budget cycle.
Overall budget trends may also affect acquisition pro-
jects. Periods of decreased funding cause austere research
and development programs which may severely limit the inves-
tigation of alternatives to meet program objectives.
The project manager's program may be affected by the
budget and funding process in many ways such as cuts in fund-
ing, changes due to program stretchout, the effects of a
delay in exercising options to buy or unexpected funding in-
creases. To most capably handle the effects of this process,
25he must possess a thorough understanding of it. Experience
in applications of budgeting and funding would also be
24
25
The previous two references do not address the relationship
of the DSARC to the annual PPBS cycle; however, an under-
standing of the documents mentioned in this paragraph and
as presented in those references should indicate the rea-
sons for decreased budget flexibility.
Various schools such as the Navy Management Systems Center,
Monterey, California, and the Defense Weapons System
Management Center, Fort Bevoir, Virginia, offer courses





highly beneficial and was recommended as a prerequisite
9 ft
for the project manager (WSAM) subspecialty designator.
G. INDISTINCT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS
AFFECTING THE PROGRAM
A number of indistinct factors affect a program through-
out its development and acquisition. Due to the pervasive-
ness of these factors, they may be difficult to recognize
and deal with. These factors include (1) program visibility
and exposure; (2) tradition, parochialism, vested interests;
and (3) inertia. All may be important in a DSARC analysis
and recommendation.
1 . Program Visibility and Exposure
Program visibility may be regarded as the program's
susceptibility, due to its importance, to examination by
those who may have an impact on it. These individuals may
include OSD officials, Congressmen, other high government
officials, the media, and the public as well as those servi e
officials directly associated with the program. Program
exposure refers to the method in which a program is pre-
sented for view by those same groups and may include such
vehicles as newspaper articles, briefings, congressional
27testimony, investigative reports and many others.
2 f>
This information obtained in discussions with Commander
Thomas Solan, USN, Office of the Assistant Director for
Subspecialty Management (WSAM Manager), 9 November 1972.
27
A particularly good example of high program visibility
and beneficial exposure regarding the F-15 Aircraft pro-
curement occurred in a recent article in the Wall Street
Journal
,
12 Feb 1973, p. 3, "McDonnell Douglas's F15
Fighter Appears Headed for Big Air Force Production Run.'
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High program visibility and derogatory exposure may
cause grievous difficulty for a system throughout its acqui-
sition. It is, therefore, incumbent on the project manager
that he understand the visibility of his program. It is
important that he monitor, analyze, and guide its exposure
carefully with constant anticipation of changing attitudes,
both in favor of and against his program. If overlooked,
this requirement may produce a negative effect on a DSARC
presentation and the future of the program.
2 . Tradition, Parochialism, Vested Interests
Tradition, the handing down or transfer of beliefs
and customs, may affect a program, particularly in its
early formulation, by introducing strengths or by intro-
ducing weaknesses such as inhibiting new alternatives from
being synthesized and analyzed. Tradition may introduce a
weakness into a service recommendation to the DSAFC as
follows. The number of units recommended by the Navy to be
procured in a shipbuilding program may be large simply be-
cause tradition dictates that large numbers of ships must
be maintained. Closer scrutiny of this traditional approach
may indicate that fewer and better, rather than more, ships
may be cost-effective and benefit the national defense to
a greater extent.
Parochialism is a restricted or confined interest.
Parochialism exists, for example, when a submariner believes
that submarine programs should take precedence over aircraft
programs, not because they are better, but because he has a
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narrowness of interest. Parochialism may affect the program
as it proceeds through its initial conception, when basic
objectives are being established, or through the pre-DSARC
process when interservice attitudes alter the project mana-
ger's presentation, Alternatives may be eliminated or basic
objectives may be altered by parochial interests.
Vested interests are those interests held by persons
for their own gain. For example, a person prominent in the
development of an alternative subsystem may promote the use
of that subsystem, even to the detriment of the major system,
because his prestige would be increased by use of his sub-
system. Often change prompted by vested interests leads to
modifications to the existing system which (1) require
other changes in the system, (2) increase the performance
capabilities of the system which are not necessary to meet
objectives, or (3) require contract changes which increase
costs and change the schedule. All these effects may be
harmful to the service effort.
The effects of tradition, parochialism, and vested
interests on a program may be similar. Any weaknesses,
disagreements, or alternatives introduced during intra-
service decision-making by either tradition, parochialism,
or vested interests may force the project manager to
accept compromise in order to reach agreement among decision-
makers. Compromise may eliminate alternatives that would
be more effective in reaching program objectives and adding
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effectively to the defense posture of the nation. A clear
understanding of program objectives, clear goals which the
project manager forcefully uses to guide program decision-
making, will aid him in overcoming the harmful effects of
tradition, parochialism and vested interests on his DSARC
presentation .
The previous discussion of tradition, parochialism
and vested interests was intended to focus on situations
where the three factors would be used within the service
as "crutches" to provide interservice personnel with argu-
ments in behalf of their own interests. The intent was not
wholly to indicate that the effects of these three factors
were all necessarily deleterious to an acquisition program.
They may all play beneficial roles if used properly. Tradi-
tion may indicate that obviously cost-effective alternatives
do not fit into existing Navy organizational systems;
changes would be required which would not benefit the Navy
as a whole. Parochialism may force a clearer statement of
program objectives to overcome its effects. Vested interests
may provide substantially increased cost-effectiveness,
within budget constraints, even though some change may be
required. The beneficial effects of these three factors
must also be considered.
3 . Iner t ia
Inertia may work to the detriment of satisfactory
program accomplishment. It may affect a program from the
service level or the OSD level.
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At the service level, when program momentum is
established, it may be difficult to stop, even when required
for effective management of the program. This forward in-
ertia, tends to force the program onward even when realistic
planning dictates that the program be stopped or that un-
completed milestones be completed before progress is con-
tinued .
At the OSD level, problems discovered in a project
prior to or during DSARC reviews may cause further progress
to be delayed. Decreased confidence in the project may
affect the timely continuance of further work. Investiga-
tion by the DSARC principals' staffs may continue or even
increase, DSARC reviews may be difficult to reschedule, and
the program may not be allowed to continue temporarily. This
type of delay, even though only temporary, imparts a differ-
ent form of inertia on the program, that of a body at rest,
which may be particulary difficult to overcome, especially
in a bureaucratic environment.
In the first case, that of forward inertia, when
uncompleted milestones are finished but other progress has
continued, problems may be discovered which call for system
changes and large quantities of rework in portions of the
system where progress had been continued. In the latter
case, a program temporarily halted, total costs may rise
significantly due to the normal rate of inflation or due to
necessary contract changes. Both forms of inertia may have
bad effects on a program.
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A clear understanding of milestone planning and
its effective application should provide the project manager,
the service, and the OSD with a guide to overcome inertia as
follows: "In planning a prcgram--to structure the program
so that progressive commitments are made only when justified
by the remaining level of program risk. In managing a pro-
gram—to assure that the premises on which program commit-
ments were originally planned have been validated, or
2 8proven, before additional commitments are made."
H. THE UNKNOWN
The unknown will be encountered in all programs and the
project manager must develop a method to deal with it. One
important way to prepare for the unknown is to build slack
29into the program schedule. With outside pressure for rapid
program completion, this may be difficult for the project
manager to accomplish, but it is a necessity. Schedule
slippage will almost certainly occur if there are no pro-
visions for slack.
However, if slack is provided for and is advertised as
such in the program schedule, it may be cut from the program
by higher authority or used for purposes other than intended.
Contractors may subconsciously understand that development
or production schedules may slip. Test and evaluation
28
29
. , Introduction to Military Program Management , Logistics
Logistics Management Institute, Washington, D. C.
LMI Task 69-28, March 1971, pp. 31-32.
Ibid .




personnel may provide for testing vhich cannot be accom-
plished without utilizing scheduled slack. It is part of
a project manager's responsibility to schedule slack in
his program while cautiously guarding its presence.
A project manager may also plan for the unknown by
developing schedule trade-offs when unknown schedule prob-
lems are not anticipated. These trade-offs are often
called "what if" or contingency plans. Intimate acquaint-
ance with cost, performance, and schedule plans should
allow the project manager to plan trade-offs that are not
obvious to all program decision-makers due to their lack
of familiarity with the program.
I. CONSIDERATIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
As is often the case in s taf f -prepared documents, the
requirements of the originator are broad in scope, and
often the drafters of the directive will attempt to meet
the originator's desires by encompassing the entire spectr m
of the topic. DOD- Directive 5000.1 is such a document. I .
attempts to provide policy guidance and to address all
issues of importance in a general manner. Interpretation
is left, however, to the reader and misunderstanding often
results
.
While the basic understanding of DOD Direct ive ' 5000 .
1
is important for all project managers, the primary purpose
of this subsection is to distill, for the project manager,
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the fundamental considerations contained in the. Directive
that are essential for the project manager to understand
prior to his presentation to the DSARC. Tailoring the
DSARC presentation to the issues at hand requires judicious
preparation and involves interstaff coordination between
program sponsor
^
program coordinator, project manager, and
OSD so that the interplay between groups will bring out
30the issues of importance. The considerations to be dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs should be addressed to
the degree required by the key system decision being made.
For example, if the recommendation to be made by the DSARC
regards program initiation, the presentation must address
the threat in more detail than need be done after the pro-
gram is approved and production is being considered, because
proceeding with the program at this decision point will be
based on whether the program meets a threat to the nation's
security. At other key system decision points, the threat
area must also be addressed, but only to the extent of what
has changed and what has occurred in the analysis of the
threat that will affect the program. It is emphasized that
each key system decision will address the following points
stipulated in the DOD Directive but at different levels of
emphasis
.
30 Further information regarding the interrelationships of
the Program Sponsor, the Program Coordinator and the
Project Manager in the development of the need/objectives
concepts are discussed in Appendix NB of the Department
of the Navy Programming Manual .
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1 . System Need/Program Objectives
The DSARC is concerned with recommending to the Sec-
retary of Defense viable defense programs. One of the basic
criteria it utilizes to make this recommendation is whether
the program is necessary in terms of what it is intended to
accomplish. This accomplishment factor is usually corre-
lated to the potential enemy threat. The level of threat
analysis discussed at the DSARC review will ultimately de-
pend upon the key system decision being made, but more impor-
tant may be the question of why the DSARC concerns itself
with the threat. The answer is twofold. One, the Secretary
of Defense determines policy and therefore desires to ensure
that defense programs that counter potential threats are
coordinated to conform to that policy; and two, this require-
ment stops the program manager from adding performance
characteristics superfluous to countering the threat. The
project manager knows that he must substantiate every facet
of his program to the DSARC. This makes the analysis of
each facet important to the service to (1) ensure that the
threat is adequately countered, (2) ensure that a capability
is cost-effective and (3) ensure overall management in
optimizing the program's contribution to the national
defense
.
The discussion of need and objectives is not neces-
sarily presented by the project manager at the DSARC review.
Often this aspect of the presentation is presented by the
OPNAV program coordinator for the Navy or his counterpart
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in the other services from their operational requirements
or, force structure groups, or other DOD components. For
example, in a past DSARC review regarding the F5E Inter-
national Fighter Aircraft both Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) and International Security Affairs (ISA) personnel
gave ten-minute presentations on need, funds, and commit-
ments prior to the Air Force project manager giving his pre-
sentat ion
.
Though the project manager may not be directly
responsible for generating and discussing the need and
objectives, he still shares responsibility to continually




• 31project management decisions.
2 . Performance Parameters
The project manager, in establishing performance
parameters, must realize that he does not possess an open-
ended budget whereby he can procure whatever the technics ns
can deliver. There must be a departure from the former ] :o-
cedure of establishing "requirements" that are at the liuiit
32
of achievable technology. The project manager should keep
performance at the point where the threat is adequately and
effectively countered and should build into the system room
31
32
The need/objective presentation made at the DSARC review
is normally classified. Because of this fact, an example
of this part of the DSARC is not included in the appendices
Paraphrased from a speech given by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
Chief of Naval Operations at a Secretary of Defense Manage-
ment Conference at AIRLIE HOUSE, 29-30 September 1972.
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for future growth only when it is considered cost effective,
A good example of this future thinking occurred in the
POLARIS weapon system. In the design of this weapon system
the immediate strategic objective was met, but plans for
the future indicated that growth capabilities should be
built in. The conversion from POLARIS to the improved
POSEIDON missle did not entail an extreme redesign process
or high new construction costs because the initial design
had provided for the planned future growth.
The DSARC will examine the management expertise of
the program presented. If the project manager can demon-
strate that the performance parameters selected, and being
used for design of the system, have been compared to the
basic objectives necessary to counter the threat, and can
provide justification that these parameters have been ex-
panded, only because of the need for growth potential and
not "gold plating," then this fact should emphasize the
positive capabilities of the project's management.
3 . Cost Parameters
The program cost estimates discussed at a DSARC
review may be considered from several aspects; portion of
program life considered, items actually included in cost
estimates, potential changes in costs utilizing alternative
systems, reliability of estimates, escalation factors, or
degree of risk. Generally, the costs addressed at a DSARC





The acquisition cost is the cost to develop and
produce the system. The items included in the acquisition
cost estimate should be clearly understood within the service
and by the DSARC. Often significant portions of this cost,
for example spare parts support, are not reflected in the





During the early stages of development, acquisi-
tion cost may be particularly difficult to estimate. During
early development, only parametric cost estimates may be
available. During later development, detailed engineering
estimates and production cost data may be developed to fur-
ther refine original estimates.
The basis for parametric cost estimating is that
costs of a defense system are related in an approximate but
quantifiable way to their physical and performance character-
istics through past experience - and data with similar items.
Advantages of parametric estimates include: (1) they may be
calculated quickly; (2) they may be inexpensive; (3) they
should realistically reflect typical program problems; and
(4) they may be utilized early in the program. Disadvantages
may include: (1) they require an extensive and correct cost
and performance data base (not one based on mismanaged
33Report to the Congress, Acquisition of Major Weapons Sys-
tems, by the Comptroller General of the United States,





programs; (2) relationships between cost, physical charac-
teristics, and performance must continue to exist and to
be valid in their extrapolation; and (3) extrapolations
involving state-of-the-art developments may be erroneous.
Detailed engineering cost estimates also have
advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage is
that they may be more accurate than parametric estimates
due to their significant, in-depth analysis. The disadvan-
tages are: (1) they may be costly due to the large man-hour
'requirements for experienced estimators; (2) they take sig-
nificant time to develop; (3) they may not reflect potential
problems or changes in the program; and (4) they may only
be available late in the development stages of the program.
Differences between actual acquisition costs
incurred, their original estimates, and, most important,
expected costs to completion should be anticipated and
explained at DSARC reviews.
b. Life Cycle Cost
Life cycle cost is defined as the total cost for
the development, acquisition, operation, and logistic sup-
port of a system over a defined life span. All support
costs should be considered in life cycle costs and discount-
ing, inflation and "trade-in" or residual value concepts
should be applied.
34Donald W. Srull, "Parametric Cost Estimating Aids DOD in
Systems Acquisition Decision," Defense Management Journal ,
Vol. 8, No. 1, (April 1972), pp. 2-5.
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Life cycle cost estimates are important to the
project manager since they may be used in cost-effectiveness
studies related to his program, in requirement studies where
more than one system is being considered, as a part of his




c. 'Design to' Cost
Though 'design to' costing has been used for some
time in commercial product development, its application to
military systems development has been fairly recent. The
objective of 'design to' costing is to develop and produce
a system within a predetermined cost constraint; that is, to
use cost as a design parameter.
The basic requirements for a 'design to' cost
target system are first, to have a good original estimate
of the cost to produce and, secondly, to have a feedback
system capable of initiating corrective action when the
'design to' threshold may be breeched. Though the benefits
of 'design to' costing include increased visibility of the
cost to produce and better identification of future value
engineering change proposal opportunities resulting from
cost feedback, the primary benefit is that it provides a





, Department of the Navy Programming Manual , Appendix J
Vice Admiral Eli T. Reich, "The Challenge of Cost-to-
Produce," Defense Management Journal
,





appropriate corrective design action early and in and
throughout the development cycle.
The application of 'design to' costing as (1)
a tool of system acquisition and (2) to provide better
program management should be stressed and the benefits it
has provided should be delineated, if applicable, at the
DSARC review.
4 . System Alternatives
"In choosing from among alternatives, the best alter-
native will be that which contributes most effectively and
37
efficiently to the attainment of a desired goal." A point
to be emphasized in the presentation of alternatives to the
DSARC is that the program has flexibility. Both the manage-
ment as well as the technical capabilities of the system
are being assessed by the DSARC. The project manager must
demonstrate firm control of the program. Alternatives
developed must consider future service environments in which
systems will operate and the presentation must indicate a
plan for continual updating.
There will be times when the stage of acquisition
will dictate the number of alternatives available. For
some programs the only acceptable alternative may be the one
that cancels the program. Whatever the situation, the impor'
tant concept to emphasize is the capability to circumvent
37
Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Manage -
Ment : An Analysis of Managerial Functions (New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 223.
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uncertainty and to have a clear path toward program objec-
tives. If a program has progressed to a position where the
only alternative is to cancel, then this situation must be
made known to the DSARC so that they are cognizant of the
circumstances surrounding their recommendation.
The number of screws to be designed into the Patrol
Frigate is an example of a system alternative discussed in
Appendix E, pages 143 through 14A.
5 . Program Plans
a. The Milestone Approach
The recommendation made to the Secretary of
Defense on whether to continue with a program is partly
based on the program manager's ability to show that mana-
gerial control of the program is sound. This is best demon-
strated by establishing firm goals and then meeting them.
3 8
This concept is called milestoning. Established goals
must relate to key, observable, and measurable events and,
most important, must be able to indicate accomplishment of
the key event. When the milest'one is accomplished, the
risk associated with the program has been reduced by an
observable amount and the chances of successful completion
of later milestones within the assigned thresholds of cost,
schedule and performance have been improved.
Milestoning will also provide the program
manager with control over concurrency. Concurrency, in the





strict sense, is the overlapping of major phases of a pro-
gram; e.g., starting the production phase prior to finish-
ing the development phase. There are situations where some
type of concurrency is necessary or desirable, such as in
the procurement of long lead-time items. Milestoning, be-
cause of its finite measurement capability, should provide
the program manager with a check point with which he may
derive information necessary to make proper decisions.
Demonstrable accomplishments are the most effec-
tive indication of program progress. For the project manager
milestones divide the total procurement into smaller portions
for which individual plans may be developed; emphasizing the
accomplishment of milestones will furnish the DSARC with the
information it needs to make its recommendation regarding
the future of the program.
b. Test and Evaluation
The Test and Evaluation Plan is one of the items
that is used to provide the explicit measurement necessary
for demonstrating accomplishment of milestones.
There are two types of test and evaluation, one
type associated with the development of the system and the
second associated with the operation of the system. Test
and evaluation must be drafted into the program when develop-
ment of the system is undertaken and must be continuous
throughout the program. Test and evaluation should provide
(1) information regarding development, i.e., development
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testing useful in resolving problems to meet development
objectives; (2) information for acquisition milestone
decisions, the best information available on completion of
milestones required for a key system decision, and (3) in-
formation for effective system operational test and evalua-
39tion efforts .
Test and Evaluation has always been an important
facet of systems acquisition but increased emphasis on this
essential operation has placed it in a position such that
the program manager must be able to discuss test and evalua-
40tion explicitly at each DSARC review. The importance of
addressing test and evaluation is emphasized by the require-
ment for the project manager to present, prior to the
initial DSARC, a copy of his overall test and evaluation
plan to the Deputy DDR&E (Test and Evaluation) for analysis.
Appendix D, pages 128 and 129 provides an
example of an outline of a test and evaluation plan.
Appendix E also provides a good discussion of this topic.
6 . Acquisition Strategy
Acquisition strategy, as viewed by the authors, is
that strategy related to the procurement or the "buying" of
the system. The document which relates directly to the
detailed "buying" strategy of a system is the Advanced Pro-
curement Plan (APP). This Plan may include the overall
39
40
Department of the Navy R D T & E Management Guide ,
op . cit
.
, p . 7-8
.
See Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of July 1970.
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system or may be made-up of several subsystem plans. The
continued updating and use of the APP as a management tool
should overcome many of the difficulties of coordinating
an effective acquisition strategy.
Topics related to acquisition strategy, as they
apply to the DSARC review, follow.
41
a. Source Selection Evaluation
The complexities of source selection dictate
that evaluation criteria be formulated early and continue
to be developed over a long period of time.
The DSARC does not normally become involved
directly in source selection although the DEPSECDEF or
SECDEF may be. However, for a more complete understanding
of the program, the DSARC is interested in information
comparing the programs of unsuccessful bidders with the
winning proposal, particularly comparisons of cost, schedule





Though it is not intended that the project mana-
ger become a contracting officer, the greater his knowledge
of contracting, the more analytical and knowledgeable can
41
42
An informative article regarding source selection evalua-
tion was contained in the Defense Industry Bulletin dated
August 1969 and was entitled "Contractor Proposal Evalua-
tion Process Defined by AMC . " The article was written by
Victor Garvis
.
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments
dated 26 June 1970 from DDR & E (Subject: DSARC Reviews
Containing Source Selection Information Briefing).
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be his approach to contracting at the DSARC review. The
project manager should be cognizant of and understand all
contract types and their applicability or lack of applica-
bility to his program.
c. Maintaining Competition
Maintaining competition during development and
prior to production can provide significant benefits for a
program. This method of decreasing risk during development
and cost of production does, however, present problems.
In many programs parallel development costs are prohibitive
because of the size and scope of the development; in others
sole source production contracts may be required. A thor-
ough analysis of trade-offs between maintaining competi-
tion and cost limitations must be accomplished at all key
system decision points to ensure maximum efficiency within
budget constraints.
d. Management Information
The procurement of management information may not
appear to be a significant part of the acquisition strategy,
but in the past great problems have arisen regarding it.
Excessive requirements were forced upon contractors, worth-
less information was reported and funds were wasted.
Because of previous difficulty, the acquisition
of management has received much attention and the Cost/
Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC) were developed to
help rectify this problem. C/SCSC aids the project manager
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in acquiring management information from which uniform cost,
schedule and performance information for meaningful appli-
cation to decision-making at the service and OSD levels may
be extracted .
7 . Areas of Major Risk
The DSARC is vitally interested in the areas of risk
which endanger program completion or may cause breeches of
cost, schedule and/or performance thresholds. To satisfy
this interest, the DSARC must be (1) appraised of the alter-
natives and trade-offs available to reduce risk and (2)
presented with an evaluation of the degree of risk and the
probability of overcoming the risks successfully. The tools
the project manager should use in the evaluation of risk for
final presentation to the DSARC are- risk management, risk
44
assessment, and risk analysis.
Risk management is the generation of alternative
courses of action for reducing risk and should be considered
when system alternatives are presented. Risk assessment is
a comprehensive, and frequently structured, process for esti-
mating the risk associated with a particular alternative
course of action. It is often handled by systems analysis
43
DOD Directive 7000.2 (Subject: Performance Measurement for
Selected Acquisitions) delineates policy regarding the pro-
curement of management information.
44 Further information including broad coverage of risk hand-
ling may be obtained in the Final Report of the USAF
Academy Risk Analysis Study Team , Colorado, 1 August 1971.
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personnel. It provides information regarding the degree of
confidence in a specific alternative. Risk analysis is
the effort of coordinating risk assessment and risk manage-
ment in an iterative cycle to develop the most feasible,
least risk alternatives for program accomplishment.
There is much subjectivity involved in risk assess-
ment. However, the primary benefit of risk assessment is
that the problem is attacked in an orderly, consistent
manner. This orderly method of solving the risk problem
can produce positive results, an increase in the project
manager's confidence in preparing for a DSARC and more
importantly, it can produce increased confidence by the
DSARC in the project manager's management of his project.
A good example of a discussion of risk is contained
in Appendix £, page 146.
8 . Special Logistic Problems
Integrated logistic support is a complex disciplin
which can provide substantial benefits for the program or
can create grave problems for the project manager. Proper
planning to insure adequate logistic support without com-
mitting resources too early, i.e., logistic support in phase
with program accomplishments, must be the goal within each
proj ect
.
Integrated logistic support planning concepts must
be developed early in the program to ensure that all logistic
elements required to support the operational system are
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properly planned, developed and coordinated with the system
design
.
The level of ILS planning and development activity
during the acquisition process must be consistent with the
needs of each phase of the acquisition process. For example,
during advanced development broad ILS planning must be
accomplished while engineering development ILS plans must be
further refined in such areas as maintenance planning,
logistic support personnel, technical logistic data and
information, support equipment, spares and repair parts,
45facilities and contract maintenance. As the acquisition
process proceeds toward production, plans become more de-
tailed and address specific milestones and problem areas.
The project manager must be able to discuss each
aspect of the ILS plan; however, detail should be tempered
in favor of the integration of the ILS plan into overall
program plans. Appendix D, pages 134 through 135 provides
an outline for such a discussion. Appendix E also addresses
this concept on page 146.
9 . Options Available
The DSARC presentation should clearly enumerate the
options available to the DSARC and DEPSECDEF. It is at this
point that the project manager has an opportunity to express
45 These are the elements of integrated logistic support as
suggested in notes prepared for the UCLA Short Course,




his services' analysis regarding what recommendation the
DSARC should make. As the person closest to the program,
the project manager's recommendation should be influential
However, the project manager's recommendation cannot be
parochial. The options presented by him should normally
include: (1) progress as recommended toward program com-
pletion, (2) choose from one. of several options for more
cautious progress toward program completion, such as one
of several proposed partial production buys rather than
the full buy, or (3) cancel the program. The DSARC presen-
tation should indicate which option the service considers
to be the best alternative.
Appendix D, pages 104 through 141, provides an




V. PROPOSED GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF THE DSARC PRESENTATION
In previous chapters, the consideration for a DSARC
presentation and the existing methods of preparation were
discussed. To improve upon existing check-lists for DSARC
preparation, a guide has been prepared to assist in prepara -
tion for key system decision DSARC presentations. For pur-
poses of cross reference, the topics in the guide are in
the same order in which they occurred in Chapter IV.
It is not the intent of the proposed guide to provide
a "cook-book" method for the preparation of the presenta-
tion. Rather, the intent is to provide a general and
flexible guide which considers all factors pertinent to
the presentation with emphasis on the non- t e chnical factors.
The project manager must provide his emphasis, as necessary,
on various portions of the proposed guide depending upon
the key system decision to be made or special issues to \ i
addressed as suggested by the DSARC principals or his
service
.
PROPOSED GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF THE DSARC
PRESENTATION
A. APPROACH TO THE DSARC PRESENTATION
The project manager's approach to the DSARC presenta-
tion must include information related to the following:
1. problem recognition and formulation, including
specification of goals and thresholds;
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2. specification of alternative courses of action;
3. identification of key uncertainties;
4. means of collection of relevant data;
5. estimation of the value of alternative courses of
action
;
6. description of the means of implementation of the
alternative chosen.
B. THE DSARC PRINCIPALS AND THEIR STAFFS
The effect of the DSARC principals and their staffs
should be considered and every effort should be made to
understand their motives, interests, and capabilities and
to provide them meaningful information on which they may
make effective recommendations.
1. Are the interests, personalities, and expertise
of each of the DSARC principals thoroughly under-
stood?
2. Is the area of management interest of each of the
DSARC principals to be addressed in the DSARC pre-
sentat ion?
3. Have open communications been maintained with the
OSD staffs to insure that the real issues are
clearly understood prior to the DSARC presenta-
tion? Have specific issues to be addressed at
this presentation been promulgated by the princi-
pals' staffs?
4. What specific disagreements between the service
and the principals or their staffs are known; who
are the persons involved and how will the disagree-
ments be settled?
C. THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PAPER
The Development Concept Paper (DCP) plays an important





1. Should the DCP be completed by the service, re-
viewed, and coordinated by the DSARC principals
prior to the DSARC?
2. Will the attitudes of the DSARC principals be
adversely affected by lack of a coordinated DCP?
3. If the completed DCP will not be reviewed by the
DSARC principals, what is the specific reason?
Is this reason really in the best interests of
the program?
D. A FIRM FOUNDATION TO ARGUE FOR THE PROGRAM
Several assumptions may have been made regarding the
key system decision at hand. All the assumptions do not
carry the same importance, but several could interfere
with an effective DSAP.C presentation. A firm foundation
to argue for the program must be available.
1. What are the assumptions on which the presentation
is based ?
2. If the assumptions or other items not directly
related to the decision at hand are questioned,
how will the questions be answered satisfactorily
when the project manager does not have the answers
in his mind; point papers, assistance of the pro-
gram coordinator, answered at a later time?
E. RELATIONSHIP TO ENTIRE MILITARY CAPABILITY
Each program must be viewed as an element contributing
to the entire military capability of the nation.
1. Is the project manager aware of broad service and
DOD objectives regarding the militarv capability
of the nation and how his program contributes to
those objectives?
2. What other programs are trying to meet basically
the same objectives?
3. Are intraservice or interservice trade-offs avail-
able to enhance the nation's military capability
and to also benefit the program?
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F. THE BUDGET AND FUNDING PROCESS
The budget and funding process pervades the acquisi-
tion of defense systems. Not only the handling of program
funds, but the broader aspects of the budgeting process
may effect the program.
1. Does the project manager understand the broader
aspects of the budget and funding process as well
as his own management of funds?
2. What are the effects of the budget preparation
sequence on the program schedule and DSARC pre-
sentation?
3. Has a "budget change plan" been prepared to
establish a priority of subsystems to accept
budget changes and provide an allocation of budget
changes of the priority listing of sybsystem?
G. INDISTINCT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS
Several somewhat indistinct internal and external fac-
tors, of which the project manager should be aware, may
affect the program.
1. How visible is the program in relation to other
programs? Is this likely to change in the future?
2. Can those who are interested in the program aid
or adversely affect the program because of its
visibility?
3. To what type of exposure has the program been sub-
jected? Must increased or decreased control of
exposure be exercised?
A. Did tradition play a part in early program deci-
sion? Will tradition affect the program at the
OSD level when interservice competition is
involved ?
5. Did parochialism play a part in early program de-
cisions or does it influence present decisions?
Does this weaken the program by forcing compromise?
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6. Have vested interests introduced excess perform-
ance and excess cost into the program? Can the
excesses be removed to improve the program?
7. Have tradition, parochialism or vested interests
decreased the alternatives available to the pro-
gram?
8. Has good milestone planning been accomplished to
overcome the effects of inertia?
9. Is forward inertia causing the program to continue
to progress when good management practice dictates
that milestones be completed before progress con-
tinued?
H. THE UNKNOWN
The unknown will be encountered during the program.
Methods of dealing with it are necessary; however, they
may have low visibility.
1. Is slack available within the schedule to compen-
sate for unknown problems? What is being done
to insure that planned slack is not used when not
necessary or unrealis t ically cut from the program?
2. How will funding be planned to compensate for the
unknown? Who knows and who should know exactly
what the program budget is?
3. What alt ernat ives/ trade-off s are available through-
out the program when technical difficulties arise?
I. CONSIDERATIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
1 . Sy s tem Need/Program Objectives
The system need and program objectives will be
discussed specifically at DSARC I, but the DSARC's that
follow will also reevaluate these.
a. Who has defined the threat and is it agreed
upon within various intelligence gathering
agencies and the services?
78

b. Do the program objectives meet the current
threat? Are there further considerations such
as future development potential of the system?
c. May the threat change in the foreseeable
future and what changes might be made in the





Performance parameters may require change during
system development, but change frequently adds cost and
lengthens schedule to completion.
a. Were performance parameters established based
on the threat?
b. Is all available technology being utilized?
Are we pushing the state-of-the-art? What is
the technical risk?
c. What performance envelope is acceptable to
insure that program objectives are attained?
What are maximum and minimum performance para-
meters and what are present expectations?
d. Have performance parameters and costs been
considered together to provide cost-effective
performance ?
3 Cost Parameters
A clear understanding of exactly what costs are
being addressed will assist the DSARC in making effective
recommendations. Often cost information is incomplete and
optimization of combinations of systems does not occur;
the total national defense is jeopardized.
a. Is the estimate of acquisition cost a point
estimate or a range of cost and what is the con-
fidence in the estimate?
b. Who made the estimate; how was it made (para-
metric cost estimate, engineering estimate) and
against what was it checked?
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c. What is the estimate of life-cycle cost? How
was it estimated and by whom?
d. Has a 'design to' ccst been established? How





System alternatives may be developed for many rea-
sons. They may reduce technical uncertainty, help to pro-
vide a lower cost system, and provide program flexibility
to overcome budget changes.
a. What system and subsystem alternatives are
presently available?
b. What is the cost-effectiveness of the major
alternatives and how do they compare with the
program objectives?
c. Why are additional alternatives still being
considered?
d. Do we need to generate new alternatives?
5 Program Plans
In addition to the strategy involved in buying the
system, the use of milestones in the program plan and the
test and evaluation plan are important facets of the over-
all program plan.
a. What are the major milestones of the program?
Why have they been established?
b. Will concurrency exist, be reduced or be
eliminated in the program with the present mile-
stones?
c. What milestones are to be accomplished prior
to the next DSARC?
d. Has a test and evaluation plan been prepared
and submitted to the Deputy DDR & E(T & E)?
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e. What testing milestones must be accomplished
before the next DSARC?
f. To what extent will the "fly before buy" con-




The advanced planning of the acquisition strategy
is particularly important since long periods of time may
be required to execute various portions of the plan; e.g.,
source selection evaluation.
a. Has the Advanced Procurement Plan (APP) been
completed and approved by the service for the
key system decision under consideration?
b. Have the criteria for source selection evalua-
tion been developed?
c. What differences were noted between the pre-
ferred proposal and the unsuccessful bidders'
proposal
?
d. Why was the contract type selected? What
advantages does it offer for the government and
the contractor?
e. How will future contracts be structured?
f. How is competition being maintained in this
procurement? What are the trade-offs between
maintaining competition and increased development
cos ts /decreased production costs?
g. Are the principles of the Cost/Schedule Con-
trol System Criteria (DOD Directive 7000.2) appli-
cable to this procurement? If so, how are they
being applied?
7 Areas of Major Risk
The major risks noted in the acquisition of the
system may be best managed by assessment, risk management,
and risk analysis. The DSARC is vitally interested in the
areas of major risk and how they are being overcome.
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a. What are the areas of major risk in the program?
How were they determined? What are the probabili-
ties of overcoming them?
b. How have alternatives been structured to over-
come risk?
8 . Special Logistic Problems
Integrated logistic support (ILS) has become a
sophisticated discipline for application to system procure-
ment. The DSARC is particularly interested in logistic
elements which remain problems and which require special
emphas is
.
a. Have all the elements of logistics been included
in the ILS plan? If not, how are those not in-
cluded being handled?
b. What logistic problems exist and what is the
plan to correct the problems?
9 . Options Available
The DSARC must be appraised of specifically what
options the service considers as presently available for
the DEPSECDEF and which the service recommends. These
options will normally include:
a. . Continue the program via the alternative plan
recommended by the service;
b. Continue the program via alternative plans such
as: cut/increase quantities; delay schedule;
change performance parameters;
c. Do not continue with further work, but gather
further information to support continuance of the
pro gram
;




This thesis provides the project manager with a set of
guidelines which can be used to better prepare his presenta-
tion for the DSARC review.
Analysis of the current procedures used by the services
led to a conclusion which supports the concept of the pre-
DSARC review. This pre-DSARC review is considered very
important to the development and refinement of the issues
of concern to the DSARC.' A beneficial effect of this pre-
review is that in addition to the presentation of issues
called out in DOD 5000.1 being refined, the less tangible
aspects to be considered are also emphasized. This pre-
review effort enables the project manager to focus his
presentation on those items of primary interest to the
DSARC.
Checklists, as developed by the Army and the Air Force
are judged as an excellent listing of many of the tangible
or technical criteria of which the project manager should
be aware in managing his program. However, it is felt
that these checklists do not provide the project manager
with broad enough guidance to completely prepare for a
DSARC presentation.
The considerations discussed in Chapter IV are what
the authors compiled from their analysis of interviews with
DOD personnel, study of service procedures and documentation
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and the study of checklists. A firm knowledge of these
considerations is believed to be necessary for the project
manager as a base for his DSARC presentation. Together
with the pre-DSARC review, these considerations will
enable the project manager to effectively, impressively,
and knowledgeably address the DSARC.
In Chapter V the authors have summarized their considera-
tions for the project manager and presented them in synoptic
form for ease of use by the project manager. The authors
believe that because of the broad nature of their proposed
guideline information, emphasizing the non-technical aspects
of the DSARC presentation, it may most effectively be pro-
mulgated informally as a general guide to be used by project
managers of all services in conjunction with other tools




THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C. 20301
30 May 1969
(Copy)
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council
I have been reviewing for some time current practices within
the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major sys-
tems. My review has highlighted the importance of our
organization and practices for accomplishing this management
job. The primary responsibility for the acquisition and
management of our major systems must rest with the individual
Services. Within each Service, this responsibility is
focused in the Project Manager. Recognizing the Service
responsibility, I am, at the same time, most anxious of in-
suring, before we approve transitioning through the critical
milestones of the acquisition of a major system, that all
facets of the acquisition process are properly considered.
The functions of the Council are separate from and do not
encompass the management reviews of major systems which I
have previously requested and which are being conducted by
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DDR&E with assistance from ASD(I&L) and ASD(Compt). These
reviews are focused on the management of the system whereas
the DSARC reviews will cover all issues, program thresholds
and other matters normally treated in DCP's. Also, the
management reviews will normally be held only once on each
major system; whereas the DSARC reviews, which are based
on program milestones, will be normally conducted three or
more times during the acquisition cycle of a particular
system .
The membership of the Council will include DDR&E, ASD(I&L),
ASD(C), and ASD(SA). For the first two milestone reviews,
that is, prior to entry into contract definition and prior
to entry into full scale development, the Council will be
chaired by the DDR&E. For the third review, related to
the transition from development to production, the Council
will be chaired by the ASD(I&L).
I am initially defining major systems, which will be subject
to Council reviews, to include (1) those for which Develop-
ment Concept Papers are required; and (2) those
.
specif i cally
designated by me for review and evaluation. A tentative
charter for the Council is attached as an enclosure. I
desire that the DDR&E and ASD(I&L) S within the next 30 days
jointly prepare the necessary procedures and take the
necessary administrative actions to implement the Council
charter
.
I believe the Council operation will result in improved
management and will augment the decision-making process
within the Department of Defense. I cannot over-emphasi i
the need for complete interface throughout the Departmen







Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
Purpose
This charter prescribes the mission, functions, composi'
tion, authority and responsibility, and administration




The mission of the DSARC is to review ma j
o
tant Department of Defense system acquisit
at appropriate milestone points in their 1
These reviews are intended to permit coord
tion and deliberation among senior manager
the most complete presentation of informat
to assure that advice given the Secretary
as complete and objective as possible prio
sion to proceed to the next step of the sy
cycle. The DSARC operation and evaluation
to complement the DCP system which remains
DOD management and decision-making system
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The DSARC will review and evaluate the status of
each appropriate system acquisition program at three
basic milestone points:
First : When initiation of Contract Definition (or
equivalent effort) is proposed;
Second : When transition from the Contract Defini-
tion phase to full-scale development is
proposed; and
Third : When transition from the development phase
into production for Service deployment is
proposed .
The first review will support the basic DCP in that
it will provide a forum for discussion and possible
resolution of the various viewpoints of the parti-
cipating principals, including the Secretary of the
Military Service sponsoring the program. The later
reviews will serve a function of validating the
readiness of a system to proceed to the next stage,




Compos i t ion
The DSARC will consist of the DDR&E, the ASD(I&L), the
ASD(Comptroller) and the ASD(SA).
5 Authority and Re s pons ib il
i
t ies
a. For consideration of entry into Contract Definition
(Contract Definition Phase) and entry into full-
scale development (the full-scale development phase),
the DSARC will be chaired by the DDR&E.
b. For the transition from development to production
(the production phase), the DSARC will be chaired
by the ASD(I&L)
.
c. For additional reviews, the DSARC will be chaired
by DDR&E or the ASD(I&L) as appropriate, depending
on whether the action under consideration is con-
cerned with movement within the full-sea], e develop-
ment phase or into or within the production phase.
d. Reviews at points other than program transition
points may be requested by a DSARC member by
memorandum to the appropriate chairman.
e. Review of a program at any point in its life cycle
may be directed by the Secretary of Defense or the
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
f. Reviews will be limited to major and important pro-
grams. These are (1) those for which Development
Concept Papers are required; and (2) those speci-
fically designated for review by the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the
appropriate DSARC chairman.
g. Aspects to be considered by the DSARC include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) For items proposed for Contract Definition
(a) Justification of military need;





(c) Relative capability compared with present/






(e) Validity of cost estimates and analysis
of cost risks involved;
(f) Validity of proposed scheduling and con-
sideration of alternatives thereto;
(g) Validity of proposed procurement methodo-
logy, including type of contractor
structure, kind of contract, timing of
Government production commitment, means
of assuring competition; and




For items proposed for transition from Contract
Definition into full-scale development :
(a) Continued validity of program objectives
and validity of changes thereto since
completion of concept formulation;
(b) Confidence in achieving current program
ob j ect ives
;
(c) Analysis of current risks;
(d) Technical feasibility, risks associated
therewith and analysis thereof;
(e) Adequacy of integrated logistics support
planning
;
(f) Validity of cost estimates, including
analysis of cost differences between
competing Contract Definition contractor
and Government estimates;
(g) Options associated with cost trade-offs
and analysis thereof;
(h) Adequate consideration of contract incen-
tives and inducement for competition; and
(i) Validity of contractor proposals.
(3) For systems proposed for initial production ;
(a) Feasibility of production, including
evaluation of milestone achievements, test




(b) Technical feasibility, including specifi-
cation requirements;
(c) Review and evaluate overall requirement;
(d) Current validity of cost estimates;
(e) Need, as appropriate, for concurrent
development and production as well as
validity of recommended time phasing of
production / deployme r. t aspects;
(f) Adequacy of integrated logistic support
planning
;
(g) The existence of adequate project manage-
ment controls ;
(h) Adequate planning for Government-furnished
equipment and facilities; and
(i) Adequate planning as to proprietary
rights items
.
h. The Chairman may invite other staff members, such
as the ASD(M&RA) and the ASD(ISA) to participate
in the reviews when the reviews have significant
relevance to their responsibilities.
i. The Chairman shall advise the Deputy Secretary of
Defense of the findings and recommendations of the
specific review and concurrently a copy of the find-
ings and recommendations will be forwarded to the
appropriate Service Secretary.
6 . Admin is t rat ion
The DSARC may establish necessary Working Groups to




THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D C 2030)
;...:; £8 m
MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Director of Defense Research & Engineering
As-sistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of Defense Agencies
SUBJECT: Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition
We have been considering within the Department, for over a year,
ways by which we can improve acquisition programs for major weapon
systems. Some steps have been taken which I believe are in the right
direction (reference my July 31, 1969 memorandum), and it is now ap-
propriate to move ahead in a concerted effort to firmly establish addi-
tional new policies and to implement them.
The prime objective of the new policy guidance is to enable the
Services to improve their management of programs. Improvement in
the execution of these programs will be made to the extent the Services
are willing and able to improve their management practices. The
Services have the responsibility to get the job done. It is imperative-
that they do the job better in the future than it has been done in the past.
It is the responsibility of the OSD to approve the policies which
the Services are to follow, to evaluate the performance of the Services
in implementing the approved policies and to mnke decisions on pro-
ceeding into the next phase in each major acquisition program.
The purpose of this memorandum is to issue broad policy guidance
which is to be translated into appropriate action by all Services and




Management in the Services will be improved only to the extent
that capable people with the right kind of experience and training are
designated to manage these major programs -- in fact all programs.
In order to be effective, program managers must be given adequate
authority to make decisions on major questions relating to the program
both in the conceptual development stage and in the full-scale development
stage. If capable people are going to be willing to undertake these impor-
tant program management assignments, ways must be found to give them
some incentive to do so. Program managers must be given more recog-
nition toward career advancement in all of the Services, and good managers
must be rewarded just as good operational people are rewarded.
If our people are to develop the experience necessary for program
management and are to utilize their experience, they must be assigned
to a given program long enough to be effective.
The overall structure of the program management function in all
Services needs to be considered. Changes must be made to minimize
the numerous layers of authority between the program manager and the
Service Secretary.
The entire management problem needs to be addressed under
these simple guidelines: put more capable people into program manage
ment, give them the responsibility and the authority and keep them ther
long enough to get the job done right.
Development
The cost of developing and acquiring new weapon systems is more
dependent upon making practical trade-offs between the stated operating
requirements and engineering design than upon any other factor. This
must be the key consideration at every step in development from the
conceptual stage until the new weapon goes into the force.
The program schedule (structure) is another very key considera-
tion. It must make sense. It must allow time for accomplishing im-
portant task objectives without unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
The ideal schedule is sequential with enough slack time for resolution




It is crucial that the right decisions be made during the concep-
tual stage. If wrong decisions are made during this period the problems
that are generated cannot easily be overcome later in the program.
Any new program will contain some risk that the technology in-
volved cannot, within reasonable time and cost constraints, be converted
into practical engineering design which meets the desired operating
requirements. There are three ways in which this technical risk can
be minimized:
1. R isk Assessment. The first is to make a careful as-
sessment of the technical problems involved and a judgment as
to how much effort is likely to be necessary in finding a solution
that is practical. A careful look at the consequence of failure,
even of "low risk" program elements, is also critical.
2. System and Hardware Proofing. The second and only
sure way to minimize the technical risk is to do enough actual
engineering design and component testing in the conceptual de-
velopment stage to demonstrate that the technical risks have
been eliminated or reduced to a reasonable level. Component
or complete system prototyping, or backup development, are
examples of this.
3. Trade-offs (risk avoida nce). Since program risk and
cost are dependent on practical trade-offs between stated operating
requirements and engineering design, trade-offs must be con-
sidered not only at the beginning of the program but continually
throughout the development stage.
Proposals for OSD approval of development programs shall in-
clude a description of how the Service or Agency intends to manage the
program to include appropriate attention to (1) Risk Assessment ; (Z) System
and Hardware Proofing; (3) Tradeoffs. When a DCP is prepared, it shall
reflect these in the management plan.
Small development projects which do not require specific OSD
approval shall also be structured to reflect these considerations.
All new programs will be kept in the conceptual development stages
until the responsible Service secretary r.nd the OSD can be assured that





Authorization to proceed into full- scale development will be given
by OSD based upon a DCP and the recommendation of the DSARC. In
making this recommendation, the DSARC shall consider in particular
whether adequate risk reduction has been accomplished.
Even though risk has been adequately addressed during the con-
ceptual development stages, full-scale development will uncover technical
and engineering problems that need to be solved. Procedures shall be
established in the development program by which these problems will
be continually addressed in view of possible trade-offs with stated opera-
ting requirements, cost, and operational readiness date.
Furthermore, it is essential to have assurance that those problems
encountered during the earlier development stages have in fact been solved.
This requires that milestones be established to demonstrate achievement
of objectives at appropriate points in the development program. These
milestones shall include such things as completion of appropriate stages
in the overall system design and testing of critical items of hardware,
e.g., subsystems and components.
Consideration must be given in development to all matters neces-
sary in a full operating system. This will include such things as
maintenance, logistic support, training, etc. However, where these
matters are dependent on the final production design, as much of this
work as possible should be delayed until the production stage. In general,
RFPs for the development stage should be carefully reviewed to eliminate
demands for reports, documentation and work tasks which are not absolutely
necessary for the efficient accomplishment of the actual development work.
These considerations and demands must be limited to those which directly
contribute to the design of the system itself.
Production
The most important consideration before moving into full-scale
production on a new weapon system is to have assurance that the engineering
design is completed, that all major problems have been resolved, and this
has been demonstrated to the extent practical by actual performance testing.
At the DSARC review when the decision is made as to whether to
proceed into full production, I want the responsible Service to certify that
the following actions have been taken:.
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1. All of the milestones which demonstrate the achieve-
ment of a practical engineering design have been met.
2. All important engineering problems encountered
during the development have been resolved with appropriate
trade-offs with stated operating requirements so that the
production, maintenance and operating costs are optimized.
The start up of production must be scheduled to minimize financial
commitments until it has been demonstrated that all major development
problems have been resolved. In most cases production engineering
and production tooling are necessary to demonstrate that the engineering
has been satisfactorily accomplished. It may also be necessary to de-
velop and demonstrate new production processes, methods and procedures,
Thus, some limited expenditure on production may have to overlap de-
velopment.
Contracts
In all our contracting, the type of contract must be tailored to the
risks involved. Cost plus incentive contracts are preferred for both
advanced development and full scale development contracts for major
systems. When the assessment of technical risk permits, such contracts
should include provisions for competitive fixed price subcontracts for
subsystems, components and materials. In many cases this will enable
a major portion of the program to benefit from competition. When risks
have been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can take place fixed-
price type contracts should be used. But the contracting officer she Id
have the flexibility to consider the technical capability of the contra .or
and other factors in selection of contract type. When fixed-price t> e
contracts are used for development programs, the contractor's fin; icial
ability to absorb losses that might be incurred must be a factor in making
the award.
It is, of course, desirable to award a fixed-price contract in a
competitive environment. It has been proven to be difficult or impossible
to achieve effective competition in a fixed-price- contract for production for
a major weapon system before full-scale development has been undertaken.
Consideration should therefore be given to the use of a negotiated fixed-price
contract after the development has progressed to the point that the produc-
tion design can be realistically specified. To the extent possible, a contract
negotiated under these circumstances should encourage competition for
subsystems, components and materials. In this way a substantial part
Of the cost can be established in a competitive environment.
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The L'se of letter contracts should be minimized. Change orders
6hould not be authorized until they have been contractually priced, or
until contractual ceilings have been established.
This guidance is provided to the Services with the understanding
that it is to be implemented within the established DCP and DSARC
policies. Other reports and reviews are to be kept to a minimum, but
the lines of communication between OSD offices and Service components
must be kept open to insure actual programs are being implemented under
this guidance.
To the extent that the above guidance conflicts with existing DoD
Directives and Instructions, the policies stated herein will govern. Since
these policies should be applied immediately, I would appreciate your
distributing this memorandum to key personnel, including ail program
managers, involved in the acquisition of major weapon systems.
I want the appropriate regulations of OSD and the Services and
Agencies to be changed or cancelled to reflect these policies. I have asked
the DDR&E to take the leadership in accomplishing this and have suggested







Department of Defense Directive
SUBJECT: Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
I. PURPOSE
This Directive establishes policy for major defense system
acquisition in the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
(referred to as DoD Components).
II. APPLICATION
This Directive applies to major programs, so designated
by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense
(referred to as SecDef). This designation shall consider
(I) dollar value (programs which have an estimated RDT&E
cost in excess of 50 million dollars, or an estimated Pro-
duction cost in excess of 200 million dollars); (2) national
urgency; (3) recommendations by DoD Component Heads or
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. In addition,
the management principles in this Directive are applicable
to all programs.
III. POLICY
A. Mode of Operation - Successful development, production
and deployment of major defense systems are primarily
dependent upon competent people, rational priorities and
clearly defined responsibilities. Responsibility and
authority for the acquisition of major defense systems
shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent
consistent with the urgency and importance of each pro-
gram. The development and production of a major defense
system shall be managed by a single individual (program
manager) who shall have a charter which provides suffic-
ient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives
97

Layers of authority between the program manager and his Component
Head shall, be minimum. For programs involving two or more Com-
ponents, the Component having dominant interest shall designate the
program manager, and his charter shall be approved by the cognizant
official within OSD. The assignment and tenure of program managers
shall be a matter of concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect
career incentives designed to attract, retain and reward competent
personnel.
1. The DoD Components are responsible for identifying needs and
defining, developing and producing systems to satisfy those needs.
Component Heads are also responsible for contractor source-
selection unless otherwise specified by the SecDef on a specific
program.
2. The OSD is responsible for (a) establishing acquisition policy.
(b) assuring that major defense system programs are pursued in
response to valid needs and (c) evaluating policy implementation
on each approved program.
3. The OSD and DoD Components are responsible for program monitor-
ing, but will place minimum, demands for formal reporting on the
program manager. Nonrecurring needs for information will be kept
to a minimum and handled informally.
4. The SecDef will make the decisions which initiate program commit-
ments or increase those commitments. He may redirect a program
because of an actual or threatened breach of a program threshold
stated in an approved Development Concept Paper (DCP). The DC1
and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) will
support the SecDef decision-making. These decisions will be
reflected in the next submission of the Program Objective Memo-
randum (POM) by the DoD Component.
Conduct of Program - Because every program is different, successful
program conduct requires that sound judgment be applied in using the
management principles of this Directive. Underlying specific defense
system developments is the need for a strong and usable technology
base. This base will be maintained by conducting research and advanced
technology effort independent of specific defense systems development.
Advanced technology effort includes prototyping, preferably using small,
efficient design teams and a minimum amount of documentation. The
objective is to obtain significant advances in technology at minimum cost.
I. Program Initiation
a. Early conceptual effort is normally conducted at the discretion






determines that a major defense system program should be
pursued. It is crucial that the right decisions be made during
this conceptual effort; wrong decisions create problems not
easily overcome later in the program. Therefore, each DoD
Component will designate a single individual, such as the
Assistant Secretary for R&D, to be responsible for conceptual
efforts on new major programs.
b. The considerations which support the determination of the need
for a system program, together with a plan for that program,
will be documented in the DCP. The DCP will define program
issues, including special logistics problems, program objectives,
program plans, performance parameters, areas of major risk.
system alternatives and acquisition strategy. The DCP will be
prepared by the DoD Component, following an agreement between
OSD and that Component on a DCP outline. The Director, Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)(or the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Telecommunications) for his programs) has the basic
responsibility for coordination of inputs for the DCP and its
submittal to the DSARC for consideration and to the SecDef for
subsequent decision. If approved, the program will be conducted
within the DCP thresholds.
2. Full-Scale Development. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that program worth and readiness warrant commitment of
resources to full-scale development, it will request a SecDef deci-
sion to proceed. At that time, the DSARC will normally review
program progress and suitability to enter this phase and will forward
its recommendations to the SecDef for final decision. Such review
will confirm (a) the need for the selected defense system in consider-
ation of threat, system alternatives, special logistics needs, estimates
of development costs, preliminary estimates of life cycle costs and
potential benefits in context with overall DoD strategy and fiscal
guidance; (b) that development risks have been identified and solutions
are in hand; and (c) realism of the plan for full-scale development.
3. Production/Deployment. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that engineering is complete and that commitment of sub-
stantial resources to production and deployment is warranted, it
will request a SecDef decision to proceed. At that time, the DSARC
will again review program progress and suitability to enter substantial
production/deployment and forward its recommendations to the SecDef
for final decision. Such review will confirm (a) the need for producing
the defense system in consideration of threat, estimated acquisition
and ownership costs and potential benefits in context with overall DoD
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strategy and fiscal guidance; (b) that a practical engineering design,
with adequate consideration of production and logistics problems is
complete; (c) that all previously identified technical uncertainties
have been resolved and that operational suitability has been deter-
mined by test and evaluation; and (d) the realism of the plan for the
remainder of the program. Some production funding for long lead
material or effort may be required prior to the production decision.
In such cases, the SecDef will decide whether a DSARC review and
revised DCP are required. In any event, full production go-ahead
will be authorized by approval of the DCP.
Program Considerations
1. System need shall be clearly stated in operational terms, with appro-
priate limits, and shall be challenged throughout the acquisition
process. Statements of need/performance requirements shall be
matched where possible with existing technology. Wherever feasible,
operational needs shall be satisfied through use of existing military
or commercial hardware. When need can be satisfied only through
new development, the equivalent needs of the other DoD Components
shall be considered to guard against unnecessary proliferation.
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of
acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements (e.g. , unit pro-
duction cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated into
"design to" requirements. System development shall be continuously
evaluated against these requirements with the same rigor as that
applied to technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs shall be made
between system capability, cost and schedule. Traceability of esti-
mates and costing factors, including those for economic escalation,
shall be maintained.
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principal design para-
meter with the magnitude, scope and level of this effort in keeping
with the program phase. Early development effort will consider only
those parameters that are truly necessary to basic defense system
design, e.g. , those logistic problems that have significant impact on
system readiness, capability or cost. Premature introduction of
detailed operational support considerations is to be avoided.
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to ensure that
the demonstration of actual achievement of program objectives is the






risk and worth shall be thereby established. Schedules shall be
subject to trade-off as much as any other program constraint.
Schedules and funding profiles shall be structured to accommodate
unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed. Progressive
commitments of resources which incur program risk will be made
only when confidence in program outcome is sufficiently high to
warrant going ahead. Models, mock-ups and system hardware will
be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level.
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A deter-
mination of operational suitability, including logistic support
requirements, will be made prior to large-scale production commit-
ments, making use of the most realistic test environment possible
and the best representation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be evaluated and presented
to the DSARC at the time of the production decision.
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics
including risk. It is not possible to determine the precise production
cost of a new complex defense system before it is developed; therefore,
such systems will not be procured using the total package procurement
concept or production options that are contractually priced in the
development contract. Cost type prime and subcontracts are preferred
where substantial development effort is involved. Letter contrar's
shall be minimized. When risk is reduced to the extent that real stic
pricing can occur, fixed-price type contracts should be issued. Changes
shall be limited to those that are necessary or offer significant 1 :nefit
to the DoD. Where change orders are necessary, they shall be on-
tractually priced or subject to an established ceiling before authoriza-
tion, except in patently impractical cases.
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor's
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and
cost-effective basis. The DoD Component shall have the option of
deciding whether or not the contract will be completely negotiated
before a program decision is made. Solicitation documents shall
require contractor identification of uncertainties and specific pro-
posals for their resolution. Solicitation and evaluation of proposals
should be planned to minimize contractor expense. Proposals for
cost-type or incentive contracts may be penalized during evaluation
to the degree that the proposed cost is unrealistically low.
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9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide
information which is essential to effective management control.
Such information should be generated from data actually utilized by
contractor operating personnel and provided in summarized form for
successively higher level management and monitoring requirements.
A single, realistic work breakdown structure (WBS) shall be developed
for each program to provide a consistent framework for (a) planning
and assignment of responsibilities, (b) control and reporting of pro-
gress, and (c) establishing a data base for estimating the future cost
of defense systems. Contractor management information/program
control systems, and reports emanating therefrom, shall be utilized
to the maximum extent practicable. Government imposed changes to
contractor systems shall consist of only those necessary to satisfy
established DoD-wide standards. Documentation shall be generated






I. Each DoD Component will implement this Directive within 90 days and
forward two (2) copies of each implementing document to the SecDef.
2. The number of implementing documents will be minimized and necessary
procedural guidance consolidated to the greatest extent possible. Selected
subjects to be covered by DoD Directives /Instructions or joint Service/
Agency documents in support of this Directive are listed in Enclosure 1.
Each DoD Component will forward the joint Service/Agency documents
for which it is responsible to the SecDef for approval prior to issuance.





5000. 1 (Encl 1]
Jul 13, 71
RELATED POLICY
Responsibility for the following policy documents is assigned to the
Cognizant Office indicated. In each case, the Cognizant Office shall
(a) generate the policy, or (b) delegate authority to a lead DoD
Component for preparation and subsequent issue of a joint Service/
Agency regulation, agreement or guide after approval by OSD.
Policy Subject
The DoD Technology Base
The DCP and the DSARC
Defense System Engineering
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VADM F. H. Price
CAPT E. J. Otth










I am CAPT Otth, project manager in the Naval Ship Sys-
tems Command for the Patrol Frigate. VADM Price has out-
lined the need for the PF Program and stated how the PF
weapons suite and quantity of ships in the program were
derived. I will continue this discussion by presenting the











The Patrol Frigate resulting from the trade-off and
effectiveness studies is shown in this artist's rendering.
The principal design parameters of the PF are:
Length (WL) (Parameters not






ADMIRAL Price has discussed how the mission analyses
were translated into the required conceptual ship with it
characteristic weapons and sensors. The chosen conceptual
design was the result of many computer iterations of pay-
load and hull combinations which gave us a high level of
confidence concerning all salient aspects of the ship design
Given this level of confidence, the CNO set cost, displace-
ment and personnel accommodation goals shown here:
Cost $45M (average cost follow ship 73$)
On balance, the additional $3M investment in a second
shaft is truly not cost effective.
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Twin screws are obviously more desirable in terms of
shafting casualties per se and ship maneuverability in
restricted waters. In PF we have addressed this by pro-
viding a retractable electric drive auxiliary propulsor
located here. This unit is capable of 'taking home' the
ship at 4-5 knots in calm seas, and has the added advantage





























































































































































































By exploiting information derived from the lead ship
phase we plan to refine the lead ship baseline to produce
a more precisely engineered instrument for series produc-
tion of follow ships.
Our approach to DODDIR 5000.1 also incorporates an
extensive test program.
Supplementing and anticipating the lead ship construe
tion we plan to erect full scale land based test sites
individually for the propulsion and combat systems. The
objectives of these facilities are shown here.
In addition to providing the means for validating the
design engineering aspects of ship integration and the
conduct of requisite test and evaluation of the critical
PF systems, the two land based test sites will assist in
the configuration management of the PF propulsion and
combat systems. Throughout the life of the PF program,
these sites will be used to evaluate change proposals
prior to application to the ships.
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After the initial validation of system integration the
two land based test sites will also be used to validate
operational test and support concepts proposed for the PF.
In addition they will serve as system level training
f acil i t ies
.
The central relationship of these test sites to the
ship acquisition schedule is depicted here. Land based
testing is used in concert with IOT&E plans for individual
equipments not now in inventory to achieve requisite level
of confidence in the design engineering of ship and equip-
ment before we commit to producing either in quantity.
Note that land based testing and equipment IOT&E schedules
provide for proofing of key systems two years before comple-
tion of the lead ship and coincides with our planned award
date for follow ship construction contracts, shown by this
vertical time line. At this point we will have sufficient
confidence in the combat system/ship integration to warrant
follow ship series production. Additional testing and
refinement will ensue at the test sites to generate data
the Navy and shipbuilders will need later to install and
check out these systems.
To build further confidence in the validity of the
design for the follow ships, the scheduled start of follow
ship construction is contiguous with completion of lead ship
fabrication. By the start of follow ship construction, the
detail design will be over 3 years mature and validated.
Thus, the PF approach is oriented to minimizing changes
during actual construction of the follow ships.
As an example of an equipment IOT&E plan complementing
the LBTS, here is the schedule for the MK92/2 FCS which
culminates in at sea tests in a DEG. It will undergo
factory acceptance tests from May to July 1974. The system
will be installed in the DEG along with the 76mm gun during
summer 1974, Then these systems will be demonstrated in
conjunction with the ship's tartar launching system. In
about the same time frame the pilot production MK92/2
system will complete factory acceptance tests and deliver
to the LBTS for integration. These correlative evaluations
are scheduled so as to attain sufficient confidence to
proceed with production by February 1975.
Finally, we will establish a follow ship baseline which
is more heavily endowed with non-deviation drawings than
any previous surface ship procurement. Where performance
requirements best serve, we will be able to use them more





Standardization, of course, bears a very central rela-
tionship to PF integrated logistic support planning. Our
principal ILS objectives are:
1. to minimize organizational level maintenance,
thereby reducing associated ship manning, and
2. to minimize the off-line time of the PF for
extensive depot level maintenance, thereby increasing
utilization of the ship.
We have, I believe, put emphasis on first things first.
For example, the ship design has been influenced strongly
by a requirement to provide easy access to equipment for
both in-place maintenance, and where appropriate, for
removal. Transfer of maintenance workload from ship to
shore will require careful planning. As an example, we
have studied the
(pages following omitted)
allocated baseline is completed. This amount is needed
for timely prosecution of ship system and detail design
and procurement of long lead time equipment for the land
based test sites and the lead ship. Award of the lead
ship construction contract is planned for the fourth
quarter of FY 73.
This slide lists the salient program risk items. The
risks are essentially to program schedules— there is little
technical risk involved. We are developing detailed plans
for monitoring the progress of each item in depth and
will be aware of any problem areas as soon as they arise.
Alongside each item in the slide is the risk management
goal and the correlative target and threshold dates by
which we expect to have sufficient confidence to proceed
with follow ships. Here again are shown the aspects of
the PF procurement plan relating to DODDIR 5000.1. So lor,
as we can resolve risks in relation to these milestone
requirements we are avoiding concurrency. We would there-
fore propose that this watch list be included in the DCP
with the requirement that we notify you when and if trouble
develops and identify a remedial course of action.
Shown here are the recommended thresholds for the PF
program. Costs are exclusive of shipbuilder escalation,
post delivery changes and outfit. The schedule milestones
reflect the watch list data in the previous slide. Of
course we have many other management milestones which we
can show you if desired.
In summary, I have discussed the ship design features
of the PF which are innovative to insure an effective yet
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less expensive ship. The PF procurement plan is structured
for shipbuilding in full accord with the intent of DODDIR
5000.1. Those systems which have significant impact on
success in terms of whole ship integration or individual
performance, namely weapons, sensors and propulsion, are
to be carefully evaluated and integrated both ashore and
where advisable at sea prior to commitment to series pro-
duction of equipment or follow PF's. I have outlined the
2 block procurement plan which is phased judiciously to
allow the lead ship design to mature to confident produci-
bility before the Navy embarks on program expansion.
From the onset of ship system design the program has
involved an integration of industry and service talent
toward mutual understanding and confidence. The PF program
has certain risk items which we will monitor closely to
insure earliest identification of problems and development
of proper remedial action. Program costs have been main-
tained essentially within established goals; however,
'then year' escalation effect cannot be accurately forecast.
We are nevertheless committed to continue to drive unneces-
sary costs out of the program. Finally, we have recommended
what we believe are reasonable thresholds for program
prosecuti on
.
We are seeking authorization of the lead ship, the land
based test sites and series production of 4 9 follow ships
in two blocks. Production of follow ships will be on condi-
tion that satisfactory IOT&E is achieved, and at that time
the Navy will verify satisfactory IOT&E, review the program
status, and request ratification of the production decision.
This concludes my prepared remarks. ADMIRAL Price and
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C. 20301
Sep 27 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SUBJECT: Patrol Frigate Program
The DSARC review of the Patrol Frigate (PF) Program held
31 August 1972 found that the Navy had done a commendable
job in the efforts to design the PF to a cost goal of $A5M
(FY 73 dollars) per ship. This is an excellent start, but
the real job lies ahead in producing the ships within the
cost goal. Based on past experience, this is going to be
a very difficult task requiring both ingenuity and strong
discipline .
I am pleased to note the strong effort to insure adequate
test and evaluation (including IOT&E) prior to major con-
tract for follow ships. However, the planned date for
the first major contract for follow ships assumes that no
critical deficiencies will be found during such testing.
The Navy should continue to give emphasis to the completion
of all feasible early T&E (including IOT&E) on the combat
subsystems and on the la^d-based test sites. The DSARC
and the DDT&E will evaluate at the time of their review of
the Navy's recommendation to proceed with follow ships
whether adequate test and evaluation (including IOT&E)
has been accomplished with satisfactory results, and if
not, whether some delay in contracting is warranted.
Also, it may be desirable that a period for operational
test and evaluation of the lead ship, prior to that ship's
full release to normal Fleet usage, be allocated to OPTEVFOR
The purpose of this testing would be to determine the
PF's expected operational effectiveness in its expected
roles and the need for any early modification to follow
ships. Should such modifications be required, a later DSARC
would have to determine the relative merits of opening
existing contracts to change by change order procedures
or making modifications after acceptance from the shipbuilde:
I have reached the following decisions:
a. The Navy is authorized to proceed with the program
for development and construction of the PF lead ship and
land-based test sites and advance procurement funding --
$191. 5M in FY 1973 for lead ship and land-based test sites
and $17. 0M in FY 1974 for advance procurement funding.
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b. The Navy should continue its planning on the basis
of the block construction schedule indicated in the DCP
and in the FYDP (24 ships followed by 25 ships, the first
block to be awarded to at least three different ship-
builders). The number of PF follow-on ships and/or the
need for any further study will be determined through the
POM process .
c. 120 days in advance of a proposed DSARC III, an
informal review of program test results and contract plans
will be provided
.
d. Approval of follow ship production should be con-
tingent upon accomplishment of adequate test and evaluation
(including 10T&E individually on subsystems, and collectively
at land-based test sites) with satisfactory results. Data
from such tests must be made available for examination prior
to DSARC III, now scheduled for March 1975. In addition,
logistics support for the all new systems and training and
manpower allocations to support all new requirements shall
be presented at the same time.
e. The Navy is requested to develop a plan for, and
evaluate the impact of assigning the lead PF to OPTEVFOR
for a reasonable period to complete an at-sea operational
appraisal of the PF as a whole prior to the lead ship's
full release for Fleet usage. This. plan and evaluation,
together with the Navy's recommendations, should be sub-
mitted to OSD at the time of preparation of the revision
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14 May 1971 APPENDIX F APSCP COO-3
DSARC CHECKLIST- PROGRAM DECISION
HAS CONCEPT FORMULATION BEEN COMPLETED?
Is the Program ready to transition to validation?
1. Operational/Mission:
a. Threat/military need/opportunity — how well defined? How credible? How stable
or timely?
b. Operational concept and objectives — new tactics or doctrine required? Tested
or gamed against threat? Results?
c. How important is this capability? Ranked with other capabilities?
d. Below what capability level is this not worth doing? Above what capability level
are technical, cost, or schedule risks too great?
2. System Alternatives and System Analysis:
a. What alternatives considered? Cost effectiveness of each (operational performance
and reliability vs cost and schedule)?
b. What measures of effectiveness considered and used? Sensitivity analysis? Results?
c. Validity of key assumptions? Who agreed to these?
d. Confidence in the system analysis? Thoroughness? Objectivity? Who did it?
e. Best arguments for and against each alternative? Risks? Criteria for selection?
3. Technical:
a. Primarily engineering or experimental? Most difficult characteristics? Ranking
of approaches by technical risks? Formal Risk Analysis?
b. State-of-the-art for key subsystems and components? Design validate by lab-
oratory demonstration? Back-up programs?
c. Confidence in achieving technical objectives in time and dollar budge s? Effect
on operational performance and budgets if only "most likely" rather than oj imistic is
achieved? At what level of technical achievement should program be killed? Performance
thresholds?
d. Preliminary performance specifications prepared? How much can bidders vary
from specified approaches?
e. Test and evaluation plan consistent with proposed program commitments?
4. Cost:
a. Confidence in cost estimates? Development? Production? O&M?
b. Who made cost estimates? How? Does estimator's position make him optimistic?
c. Have costs been validated by OASD (systems analysis)?
d. Cost of proposed program vs. comparable items? How sensitive to schedule?
e. Would contractors take contract at estimated cost if no way to "get well"?
5. Schedule:
a. Confidence in schedule estimates? Development? Production? IOC?
b. Schedule of this program vs. comparable items?
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c. Urgency of schedule? Why not slip IOC date? ^)
d. Pacing items? Confidence that schedule for these will be met? Defer program
commitment until more confident?
e. Schedule thresholds?
6. Procurement:
a. Alternative contractor structures (prime, associate)? Pros and cons?
b. Kinds of contracts (CPFF, FFP, FPI, etc.)? Are these same for Validation Phase,
development, production? Are these appropriate? Pros and Cons?
c. How to limit premature Government commitment? By Achievement Milestones in
contracts? Excessive contractor risks?
d. Initial procurement - how competitive? How to maintain competition?
e. Procurement plan, e.g., Validation Phase followed by Full Scale Development;
parallel competitive development, etc.? «
f. Indicate what has been done to scrub RFP of unnecessary or marginal performance,
management and data requirements.
g. Has Advance Procurement Plan (APP) been prepared? Has a copy been forwarded
toOASD(I&)?
7. Program Management:
a. Service management of contractors — how much? What kind? Monitor? Control?
b. Service Program Manager — how long on program? Experience? Authority for en-
gineering and contract changes, funding, etc.? Number of approval levels between Pro-
gram Manager and DepSecDef?
c. His staff now? Later? Their experience? Capability? Other help, e.g., FCRC, Gov-
ernment Lab? Independent capability for important areas (contracting, reliability, etc.)?
j
Tenure of key members of PM staff?
d. For Joint Service Programs has Joint System/Project Manager Charter been
established and approved? If Not, Explain?
8. Presentation. The presentation should relate to and include comments on the DCP, spe-
cifically addressing the issues contained in the DCP. The presentation must reveal the
status of the program's readiness to transition to the next phase; that is, that the pre-
requisites to Validation Phase have been satisfactorily accomplished).
a. Primarily engineering rather than experimental effort is required, and the tech-
nology needed is sufficiently in hand.
b. The mission and performance envelopes are defined.
c. The best technical approaches have been made.
d. A thorough trade-off analysis has been made.
e. The cost effectiveness of the proposed item has been determined to be favorable
in relationship to the cost effectiveness of competing items on a DOD-wide basis.
f. Cost and schedule estimates are credible and acceptable.
153

14 May 1971 AFSCP 800-3
DSARC CHECKLIST- RATIFICATION DECISION
HAS VALIDATION BEEN COMPLETED?
Is the program ready to enter full scale development?
1. General:
a. Have program objectives changed since CF/Validation Phase completed? How
and why?
b. Confidence in achieving- current objectives (operational performance, cost, sched-
ule)? Basis for confidence?
c. New risks or increases in already known risks identified in Validation Phase? Total
risk greater or less than before Validation Phase?
d. Significant changes in key premises or characteristics? Jf yes, reassessment of
new estimates vs. military value? Thresholds on key characteristics or premises?
2. Technical:
a. Proposed development vs. present state-of-the-art? Primarily engineering rather
than experimental?
b. Was design extended far enough in Validation Phase to identify risks? Name
highest risk areas — how risky? Design validation of risk areas? Back-up programs needed?
With these risks, should we proceed with "hard" development contracts?
c. Significance of variations in technical aspects by competing Validation Phase
contractors? How or why is winner's the best?
d. Are performance and test specifications matched to program, state-of-the-art,
kind of management? Flexible enough without contract changes?
e. Test and Evaluation plan consistent with proposed program commitments? Inte-
grated test program?
3. Cost:
a. How realistic are cost estimates? Basis? All significant cost elements; /b? - example,
test facilities/equipment) included?
b. Significant differences in cost estimates between Government and contractors?
Analysis of these differences? Do they give clues to uncertainties in real cost? Clues to
whether we should go ahead?
c. Have program costs been validated by OASD (systems analysis)?
d. Compare cost estimates for this program to similar programs? Differences? Anal-
ysis of differences?
e. What program features most affect total cost, funding rate, R&D vs. other funds?
What program options (examples: change overall schedule, do pacing subsystems first,
test less before production release) help cost or funding? Program designed to avoid
excessive funding peaks? Excessive early expenditures?
4. Schedule:
a. How to preserve IOC date and minimize early resource commitments? What parts
of program are deferrable? For how long?
b. Realism of IOC date; that is, will all necessary items be ready (tactics, trained
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people, facilities, test equipment, spares, etc.)? Who is making these schedules mesh?
Non-R&E resources programmed?
c. Difficulty of schedule? Pacing elements? Which ones most likely to slip? Action to
reduce this risk?
d. Significant differences in schedules by competitors? Analysis of these differences?
Clues to uncertainties and the real contract schedule?
5. Program Management:
a. What is the service management staff for this program? Adequate? Need to do
something; for excnn}>lc, high-level program manager, get him more help? His tenure and
that of his key personnel?
b. Service management concept tailored to program, contract type, etc.? How will
contractor be managed (monitor, control)?
c. Government and contractor cost, schedule, technical performance reporting sys-
tems? Will they predict? flow close to real time on major aspects?
d. Any new management systems or techniques? What are they?
e. For joint service program — have joint service operating procedures been de-
veloped—if not explain.
6. Management:
a. Has updated Advance Procurement Plan been submitted to OASD(I&L)?
b. Procurement plan matched to program and risks? Contract type consistent with
risks? Contractual achievement milestones?
c. Contract negotiated while competition existed. Contract incentives? Do they
motivate? Importance to us?
d. "Goodness" of contract from Government view? Contractor's?
e. Additional commitments by contractor; for example, production options? Adequate
flexibility for Government?
f. What happens if contractor gets in trouble? What options does the Government
have?
g. Is this a "buy-in"? Any contract features to help contractor "get well"? Pi vent
him from "getting well"? Has suspected "buy-in" been discussed with bidder's top mi age-
ment?
7. Contractor and Proposal:
a. Best contractor or best proposal? How better? Strong points? Weak points?
b. Difference in evaluation of competing proposals? Winner best in which areas? Are
they the most important areas?
c. Competence of winner and loser, judged by Validation Phase effort alone? Past
records of competitor (cost, schedule, performance)? Other factors evaluated?
d. Importance of program to contractors? Contractor's Validation Phase team to do
development? Continuing high-level attention?
e. Major associate and subcontractors identified and committed?
f. Indicate what was done to scrub the RFP and proposal of unnecessary and marginal
requirements for performance, management, and data requirements.
8. Presentation. The presentation shall ascertain that the program proposed to go forward
is consistent with the DCP and its thresholds.
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DSARC CHECKLIST- PRODUCTION DECISION
HAS DEVELOPMENT BEEN COMPLETED?
Is the system ready for release to production?
1. General:
a. Significant program changes during development? Examples: expected operational
availability date? initial production cost? military need? utility of item this is to replace?
technology breakthrough? program objectives?
b. Compare original program goals (cost, schedule, performance) with current ex-
pectations.
c. Original evaluation of importance of this capability vs. current evaluation.
2. Technical:
a. Status of development? Any items not design frozen? Any prototype items not yet
fabricated? What tests not yet completed? Integrated prototype lab tests? Operationally
tested? Reliability tested? All achievement milestones completed (prerequisite to pro-
duction)?
b. Status of accessory and auxiliary items? Test equipment/facilities? Training
equipment, materials/instructions? Nucleus of trained people?
c. Remaining technical risks. Rate and significance of design changes?
d. New technology to be considered before production?
e. Status and quality of specifications?
f. Test program consistent with proposed program commitments? Integrated test
program?
3. Cost:
a. How realistic are production cost estimates? Basis? All significant cost elements;
for example, test facilities/equipment included?
b. Have program costs been validated by OASD (systems analysis)?
c. Compare production cost estimates for this program to similar programs. Differ-
ences? Analysis of differences?
d. What program alternatives may help cost and funding? {Examples: schedule
change, breakout, open up for competition.)
e. What program features most affect future costs? Funding rate? Program designed
to avoid excessive funding peaks? Excessive early expenditures?
4. Schedule:
a. How to preserve IOC date and minimize early commitments?
b. Do what now to improve probability of meeting schedule? Pacing items? Which
most likely to slip?
c. How much concurrency and schedule compression? Necessary? Gains vs. risks?
Extra resources or management action required because of compression?
d. What factors external to program (threat; associated hardware, construction, or
software) most influence schedule?
e. Realism of IOC date; that is, will all necessary items be ready (tactics, trained
people, facilities, etc.)? Who is making schedules mesh? Non-R&D resources programmed?
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5. Procurement:
a. Has updated Advance Procurement Plan been submitted to OASD (I&L)?
b. Size of first production buy? Why tbis quantity? Priced options for addition;;]
quantities? Adequate Government flexibility re options?
c. First buy competitive? Pros and cons? When competitive?
d. Under what circumstances will first buy be competitive? What criteria for selec-
tion? How important is cost? Technical?
e. What has been done to assure that technical data package is adequate for pro-
duction release? When? Pilot Production? Reviewed by independent agency? Bind con-
tractor to data package or performance requirements?
f. Does contract contain provisions to assure adequacy of data package for production
prior full-production release? Options?
g. Indicate what was done to scrub RFP and proposal of unnecessary and marginal
performance, management and data requirements.
6. Program Management:
a. Service management concept tailored to program and contract type? How will
contractor be managed (monitor, control)?
b. Government and contractor cost, schedule, technical performance reporting
systems? Will they predict? How close to real time on major aspects?
c. Configuration management? Integrated logistics support? Other important man-
agement information systems?
d. Present (and planned) integration between design and production engineering?
Motivation to design for producibility? When will production contractor enter program
(if different from developer)? How to transfer know-how from developer?
e. Service management staff? Adequate? How different for production phase? Early
field engineering support? Continuing technical support? Tenure of project manager and
key personnel. Authority re support organizations? Authority for changes to contract,
specifications, funding, etc.?
7. Presentation. The presentation shall ascertain that the program proposed to go forward
is consistent with the DCP and its thresholds.
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APPENDIX
CHECKLIST FOR MIILESTONE I REVIEWS
(END OF CONCEPTION PHASE AND
ENTER VALIDATION PHASE)
Purpose of Milestone I ASARC/DSARC.
The purpose of the Milestone I review is to determine whether or not
the Conceptual Phase has been completed and whether the program is
ready to transition to the Validation Phase. The Milestone I review will
be held at such time that the Army has determined that
—
a. The system satisfies a real military need, is worth its cost and is of
sufficient priority to be funded within overall fiscal contraints. The pro-
posed development is in consonance with the Required Operational Capa-
bility (ROG).
b. Mission profiles and performance envelopes are adequately denned
and are based upon sound and balanced military, technical and economic
objectives.
c. Major uncertainties are identified and a suitable method of resolu-
tion is planned for the Validation Phase.
d. Preliminary cost and schedule estimates are realistic and accept-
able.
e. The management approach and program planning are sound.
/. The DCP/DPM APM thresholds are well defined and provide tl
flexibility for accomplishing the appropriate trade-offs in the Validatic .
Phase while insuring the surfacing of significant problems.
g. Critical questions and issues associated with operational suitability,
effectiveness, C-E systems, electromagnetic compatibility, the adequacy
and essentiality of signal security features and characteristics and fre-
quency supportability are identified to the maximum extent possible.
h. The environmental impact is minimized and acceptable.
t. Logistic planning appropriate to the Conceptual Phase has been
accomplished.
1. BACKGROUND.
The presentation should relate to the ROC and the DCP/DPM/APM,
specifically addressing issues and the viability of thresholds. It must ad-
dress the program's readiness to transition to the next phase (i.e., pre-
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requisites). The presentation shall assure that the proposed program is
consistent with the DCP/DPM/APM. The operational, technical, schedul-
ing, costs, procurement and program management considerations of in-
direct or "spillover" effects of the system should be addressed.
2. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT.
a. Threat/military need/opportunity—how well defined? How cre-
dible? How stable or timely ? Precise statement of the ROC?
b. Operational concept and objectives—new tactics or doctrine re-
quired? Tested or gamed against threat (to include EW and SIGINT
exploitation) and appropriate environments including the electromagnetic
environment? If the system radiates electromagnetic energy, has a con-
ceptual, formal vulnerability analysis been performed? Results?
c. Has the Army Analysis of Intelligence (AAT) been considered in
the development of the threat or separately developed threats been coor-
dinated with ACSI during each stage of development?
d. How important is this capability? Ranked with other capabilities?
e. Below what capability level is this not worth doing? Above what
capability level are technical, cost, or schedule risks too great? Target
level established by trade-offs?
/. Have issues to be addressed through operational testing been iden-
tified?
g. Does the test program adequately address operational mission is-
sues?
3. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS.
a. System alternatives.
(1) What alternative systems and system designs have been con-
sidered? Present system considered? Cost and benefits of each (opera-
tional performance, reliability, maintainability and electromagnetic cap-
ability versus total life-cycle cost to include electromagnetic frequency
spectrum usage and schedule) ?
(2) What measures of benefits /effectiveness considered and used?
Sensitivity analysis? Results? Issues in need of operational testing?
(3) Confidence in system analysis? Thoroughness? Objectivity?
Agency doing system analysis?
(4) Best arguments for and against each alternative? Risks?
Criteria for selection?
(5) Marginal features?
b. Cost and benefits analysis.
(1) Confidence in cost estimates to include parametric cost analy-
ses? Development? Production? Cost of ownership? MCA?
(2) Confidence in benefits of effectiveness estimates?
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(3) Who made estimates of cost? Of effectiveness? How? How was
objectivity assured? Have the costs been explained in terms of required
effectiveness for all or part of the forces in terms of realistic contingency
missions (quality and quantity trade-off analysis).
(4) Have costs been validated by COA and/or OASD (Systems
Analysis) ?
(5) Cost of proposed program versus comparable items in com-
parable dollar terms? How sensitive to schedule?
(6) Are DCP/DPM /PM itemized costs expressed in both constant
and then year dollars?
(7) How have provisions been made to assure traceability of esti-
mates? Will overhead estimates for both the in-house and contractor
costs be visible throughout the program?
(8) How will the program insure that discrete cost elements will be
translated into "design to" requirements?
(9) Is the impact on the electromagnetic spectrum considered in
the cost and benefit analysis?
4. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT.
a. Primarily engineering or experimental? Most difficult charac-
teristics? Ranking of approaches by technical risk? Formal Risk Analy-
sis? Relate consequence of failure to risks.
6. State-of-the-art for key subsystems and components? Design vali-
dated by laboratory demonstration? Back-up programs? Amount of test-
ing accomplished to eliminate or reduce risks? Assessed in technical por-
tion of RFP?
c. Confidence in achieving technical objectives in time and dollar
budgets? Effect on operational performance and budgets if only "most
likely" rather than optimistic is achieved? At what minimum level of
technical achievement should program be stopped?
d. Do performance thresholds permit trade-offs?
e. Critical OTE questions and issues as identified in the DCP/DPM/
APM and CTP? Identify critical questions and issues which must be
answered by Development and or Operational Test and Evaluation and
outline the plan and schedule milestones for accomplishing.
/. Are the test and evaluation issues covered in the DCP/DPM 'APM
and is a proposed schedule of test milestones included? Is adequate time
scheduled for test results to be available for consideration prior to deci-
sion?
g. Effort planned for Reliability and Maintainability improvement to
reduce O&M costs. Have Reliability and Maintainability goals been es-
tablished? Relate these to mission requirements.
h. Is a competitive prototype program warranted? Is competitive
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t. Will electromagnetic compatibility be assessed to a satisfactory
degree?
_y
;. Does DCP/DPM/APM address system susceptibility to EW and
SIGINT exploitation.
k. Have all means been considered to eliminate or minimize degrada-
tion of the environment?
5. SCHEDULE.
a. Confidence in schedule estimates? Development? Production?
IOC?
b. Schedule of this program vs comparable items?
c. Urgency of schedule? Why not slip IOC data? What drives re-
quired IOC date? Relate this to any concurrency. What are the essential
trade-offs?
d. Pacing items? Confidence that schedule for these will be met?
Defer program commitment until more confident?
e. What provisions have been made for trade-off with cost and system
capability?
6. PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT.
a. Procurement plan, e.g., Validation Phase followed by Full-Scale
Development Phase; competitive prototypes; parallel development; kinds
of contracts (CPFF, FFP, FPI, etc) for validation, full-scale development,
production : Are those appropriate? Pros and cons?
6. Alternative contractor structures (prime, associate)? Pros and
cons?
c. How to limit premature Government commitment? Achievement
Milestones in contracts? Excessive contractor risks?
d. Initial procurement—how competitive? How to maintain competi-
tion?
e. RFP scrub of unnecessary or marginal performance, management
and data requirements? What required reports and data unnecessary?
/. Has Advance Procurement Plan (APP) been submitted to ASA-
(I&L), ASA(R&D), and ASD(LfcL) for review?
g. How did the source selection take into account the contractor's
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-
effective basis?
7. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
a. Management system for program control. Will MIL STD 881 and
DODD 7000.1 be fully implemented?
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c. Army Project Manager—how long on program? Planned tenure?
Experience? Authority for engineering and contract changes, funding,
etc.? Number of approval levels between Project Manager and DEP-
SECDEF?
d. His staff now? Later? Their experience? Capability? Other help,
e.g., FCRC, Government Lab? Independent capability for important areas
(contracting, reliability, etc.)? Tenure of key members of PM staff?
e. For Joint Service Programs has Joint System/Project Manager
Charter been established and approved? If not, explain.
8. ASARC/DSARC REVIEWS INVOLVING SOURCE SELECTION.
a. Unsuccessful bidder status? Provide summary comparing the pro-
posed programs of unsuccessful bidders with winning bidder(s).
b. Credibility of cost/perofmance proposed?
c. Did any bidder claim that Government requirements were unrealis-
tic? What basis?
9. SECURITY.
Summarize the security classification of the program ; system, com-
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CHECKLIST FOR MILESTONE II REVIEWS
(END OF VALIDATION AND BEGIN
FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT)
Purpose of Milestone II ASARC/DSARC.
The purpose of the Milestone II review is to evaluate the readiness
of the program to enter Full-Scale Development. The Milestone II re-
view will be held at such time that the Army has determined that:
a. Appropriate analyses (trade-off, parametric cost, cost and effective-
ness) are available to confirm the need for the system in consideration
of the threat, system alternatives, special logistic needs, communications-
electronics impact, estimates of development cost, preliminary estimates
of life cycle costs and potential benefits in context with overall Army
strategy- and fiscal guidance.
b. The system still satisfies a real military need, is still worth its
cost, and is still of sufficient priority to be funded within overall fiscal
constraints. The development is in consonance with the ROC.
c. Risks have been reduced to acceptable levels and a suitable method
of resolution is identified in areas of residual technical risk.
d. System trade-offs have produced a proper balance between cost
and performance.
e. Cost and schedule estimates are realistic and acceptable.
/. System configuration and performance specifications have been de-
veloped sufficiently to permit Full-Scale Development to begin.
g. The management approach and program planning are sound.
h. The contractual aspects are sound.
t. The DCP/DPM/APM thresholds are well defined and provide suf-
ficient flexibility for engineering development whi]e insuring the surfacing
of significant problems.
j. Critical test issues, as identified in the DCP/DPM/APM and the
CTP, have been reviewed and refined to determine what T&E (including
OTE) must be scheduled and conducted.
k. Electromagnetic compatibility and frequency supportability have
been evaluated as being satisfactory.
I. Verification that environmental objectives can be attained.
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m. The analysis of vulnerability to hostile EW an£ STGINT exploita-
tion is updated and appropriate hardening trade-off analyses accomplished,
as appropriate.
n. Logistics planning appropriate to the Validation Phase has been
accomplished.
1. BACKGROUND.
a. Have prog-ram objectives changed since Conceptual Phase comple-
tion and during Validation Phase? How and why?
b. Significant changes in key premises or characteristics? If yes,
reassessment of new estimates vs military value? Thresholds on key char-
acteristics or premises?
c. Threat still credible (conforms with the AAI cr has been coordin-
ated with ACSI) ?
d. Confidence in achieving current objectives (operational perform-
ance, electromagnetic compatibility, reliability, cost, schedule) ? Basis for
confidence?
e. Formal risk analysis made—New risks or iicreases in already
known risks identified in the Validation Phase? Trade-offs made?
Have risks been reduced to acceptable level for Full-Scale Develop-
ment?
/. What are the operational, technical, cost, scheduling, procurement,
and program management implications of indirect or "spillover" effects of
the system.
g. Have SIGSEC considerations been addressed as appropriate?
System vulnerabilities; development and production of crypto materiel;
coordination with NSA or has delegation of authority been obtained for
the Army to develop required crypto materiel in support of the system?
2. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT.
a. Proposed development vs present state-of-the-art? Primarily en-
gineering rather than experimental?
b. Efforts planned for reliability and maintainability improvement
to reduce O&M costs. Have reliability and maintainability requirements
and thresholds been set? Contractual requirements including test provi-
sions? Icentives?
c. Effort planned for electromagnetic compatibility improvement to
minimize impact upon the spectrum. Have electromagnetic compatibility
requirements been set? Do these requirements inckde test provisions?
d. Design extended far enough in Validation Phase to identify risks?
Name highest risk areas—how risky? Design validation of risk areas.
Back-up programs needed? Available solutions in liand? With these risks,
should we proceed with "hard" development contracts?
e. Hardware and/or software testing done to reduce or remove risks?
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What critical problems and issues earlier identified as requiring test have
been resolved? What critical problems and issues remain to be resolved
through test and evaluation (including OT&E) prior to procurement de-
cision and what are the plans and schedule milestones for accomplishing.
/. Significance of variations in technical aspects by competing Vali-
dation Phase contractors? How or why is winner's proposal the best?
g. Operational requirements and test specifications matched to pro-
gram state-of-the-art, kind of management? Flexible enough without
contract changes?
h. Test and evaluation plan consistent with proposed program com-
mitments? Integrated test program? Identify achievement milestones?
i. Operational and technical test and evaluation issues been refined
and submitted to DDRE for review?
j. Is effort planned to reduce system susceptibility to potential hostile
EW threat? The formal vulnerability analysis been updated? Results?
k. Environmental pollution control features have been specifically
reviewed and evaluated.
3. COST AND BENEFITS.
a. How realistic are cost and benefits /effectiveness estimates? Basis?
All significant cost elements (e.g., test facilities/equipment electromag-
netic spectrum and cryptomaterial) included? Are costs expressed in
both constant year and then year dollars?
b. Significant differences in cost estimates between Government and
contractors? Analysis of these differences? Do they imply uncertainties
in real cost and performance? "Is a 'should cost' analysis warranted?"
c. Have the costs in terms of required effectiveness for all or part of
the forces in terms of realistic contingency missions been assessed (quality
versus quantity trade-off analyses).
d. Have program costs been validated by COA and/or OASD (Sys-
tems Analysis) ?
e. What program features most affect total cost, funding rate, R&D
vs. other funds? What program options (examples? change overall sched-
ule, do pacing subsystems first, test more or less before production release)
help total life cycle cost or funding? Program designed to avoid excessive
funding peaks? Excessive early expenditures?
/. Life cycle cost analysis for the alternative proposed programs?
g. Is funding profile consistent with OSD/Congressional constraints?
h. Does a highly visibile cost trail exist thus far?
t. Cost effectiveness versus design alternatives?
4. SCHEDULE.




b. How to preserve IOC date and minimize early resource commit-
ments? What parts of program are deferrable? For how long? Why
are they deferrable?
c. Realism of TOC date, i.e., will all necessary items be ready (tactics,
trained people, facilities, supporting communications, test equipment,
spares, etc)? Who is making these schedules mesh? Non-R&D resources
programed?
d. Difficulty of schedule? Pacing elements? Which ones most likely
to slip? Action to reduce this risk. Effect on system(s) to be replaced?
e. Significant differences in schedules by competitors? Analysis of
these differences? Clues to uncertainties?
/. Are schedules consistent with OSD/Congressional constraints?
5. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
a. What is the Army management staff for this program? Adequate?
Project Manager tenure and that of his key personnel?
b. How will contractor be managed (monitor, control)? Is MIL STD
881 and DODD 7000.1 being implemented?
c. Government and contractor cost, schedule, technical performance
reporting systems? How close to real time on major aspects?
d. For Joint Service Program—have Joint Service Operating Pro-
cedures been developed? If not explain.
e. How will change control be managed? How will change proposals
be reviewed to insure that they are limited to those that are necessary or
offer significant benefit to the Army?
/. Have discrete cost elements (e.g., unit production cost, operating
and support cost) been translated into "design to" requirements?
6. PROCUREMENT/ASSESSMENT.
a. Has Advance Procurement Plan (APP) been submitted to ASA
(I&L), ASA (R&D), and ASD (I&L) for review?
6. Procurement plan matched to program and risks? Contract type
consistent with risks? Contractual Achievement Milestones?—associ-
ated contract options? Have provisions for formal trade-off analyses been
incorporated into development plan?
c. Contract negotiated while competition existed? Contract incen-
tives? Do they motivate? Importance to us?
d. Advantageous features of contract from Government view: Con-
tractor's? What is Government liability at each stage of contract?
e. Additional commitments by contractor, e.g., production options?
Adequate flexibility for Government?
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g. Is this a "buy-in"? Any contract features to help contractor
"get well"? Prevent him from "getting well"? lias suspected "buy-in"
been discussed with bidder's top management?
h. How did the source selection take into account the contractor's
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-
effective basis?
7. CONTRACTOR AND PROPOSAL.
a. Best contractor or best proposal? How better? Strong points?
Weak points?
6. Difference in evaluation of competing proposals? Winner best in
which areas? Are they the most important areas?
c. Competence of winner and loser, judged by Validation Phase effort
alone? Past records of competitor (cost, schedule, performance)? Other
factors evaluated? Is 'contractor's enpineering/test/production staff ade-
quate to adhere to program objectives?
d. RFP and reports SCRUB? Indicate what was done to scrub the
RFP and proposal of unnecessary and marginal requirements for per-
formance, management and data requirements. Identify the documenta-
tion that could be reduced or eliminated.
8. ASARC/DSARC REVIEWS INVOLVING SOURCE SELECTION.
a. Unsuccessful bidder status? Provide summary comparing the
proposed programs of unsuccessful bidders with winning bidder.
6. Credibility of cost/performance proposed?
c. Did any bidder claim that Government requirements were unrealis-
tic?
9. SECURITY.
Summarize the security classification of the program, system, co -
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CHECKLIST FOR MILESTONE Ila REVIEWS
(LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION)
Purposes of Milestone Ila ASARC/DSARC.
The purpose of the Milestone Ila ASARC/DSARC review is to de-
velop a recommendation for the Secretary of the Army or SEC/DEF on
transitioning a weapon system into a low rate initial production. Such
production is authorized for the basic purpose of obtaining a quantity of
representative production prototype test items. The factors to be con-
sidered in authorizing a low rate initial production of major systems in-
volve a combination of test, development lead time, economic factors, and
a production rate consistent with retention of the management, engineer-
ing, and production skills which are essential to program integrity and
learning. These factors should be kept in mind in following this checklist.
The Milestone Ila review will be conducted at such time that the Army
has determined that
—
a. Development testing and operational testing (DT/OT) have been
accomplished such that important characteristics were tested sufficiently
enough to indicate major developmental problems and critical operational
issues have been or should be satisfactorily resolved by the end of develop-
ment.
b. The system still satisfies a valid military need or ROC, responds
to the current threat, is still worth its projected costs, and is of sufficient
priority to be funded within overall fiscal constraints.
c. Initial Producibility Engineering and Planning (PEP) has been
sufficiently conducted to indicate confidence in production planning, esti-
mated costs and results. PEP consists of those planning and engineering
measures undertaken to insure the timely and economic producibility of
essential materiel. PEP generally includes data packages, e.g., engineer-
ing drawings, bills of materials, quality assurance procedures, planning
for plant layouts, parts lists, and descriptions of manufacturing proced-
ures. In some cases, PEP may also include the design of some special
purpose production equipment, tooling and computer modeling/simulation
of manufacturing processes to confirm producibility.
d. Development and production risks have been identified. The re-
mainder of the development phase, development and operational testing,
(DT/OT) and PEP will deliberately address such risks as evidenced in





e. System definition (specifications, drawings and associated docu-
mentation) incorporate initial findings of the development and DT/OT
efforts are adequate for low rate initial production purposes. When will
competition be introduced into the production phase. If none planned,
why?
/. The contractual aspects are sound for the remainder of develop-
ment and for low rate initial production.
g. DCP/DPM/APM thresholds are sufficiently defined to assure iden-
tification of major development and production program variances.
h. Analyses (trade-off, threat, risk, parametric cost, cost and effect-
iveness, vulnerability to hostile EW and SIGINT efforts, communica-
tions-electronics considerations, and logistic support) confirm the desir-
ability of making the transition to low rate initial production. New analy-
ses to support the Milestone III review and decision process are planned
and programed.
t. Initial issue quantity requirements for major systems will be
displayed by projections of the BOIP in the Structure and Composition
System (SACS).
1. BACKGROUND.
a. Review program objectives including:
(1) Significant program changes that occurred during develop-
ment.
(2) Description of the original program goals (life cycle costs,
schedule, and performance) compared with current expectations, to
include how well the "design-to" estimates were met as evidenced during
initial DT/OT.
6. Provide brief summary of the operational need and mission require-
ments, per revised section I of the Development Plan, including:
(1) Concept analysis.
(2) Cost-benefit trade-off analysis. Quantity versus quality should
be revalidated in terms of realistic missions and forces.
(3) Current and anticipated threat—if a range exists in the intel-
ligence community, provide it.
(4) Related tactics and doctrine.
(5) Reasons for requiring a new system, including operation and
support personnel costs as well as materiel costs and technical compari-
sons with systems to be replaced or supplemented.
2. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT.
Assesses the status of weapon system and the major subsystems and
components to
—
a. Assure that necessary preproduction prototype testing to include
operational testing is programed or pilot production technical and op-
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erational testing is programed, both to assure the meetings of performance
bands, specified technical criteria and those necessary to estimate opera-
tional effectiveness, suitability (including reliability, availability, main-
tainability (RAM), electromagnetic compatibility, EW vulnerability, and
training requirements), and optimization of tactics. Assure that testing
confirms compatibility with other systems and equipment it must operate
within the field. Assure that testing validates the possible basis of issue
(BOD-
b. Establish that sufficient design and performance band achieve-
ment milestones (prerequisites to low rate initial production) have been
achieved, and all major problems can be identified, resolved or appropri-
ate trade-offs made.
c. Assure EW vulnerability testing in actual or simulated opera-
tional EW/SIGINT environment. Assess the ability of the system to op-
erate effectively in relation to expected EW/SIGINT threat.
d. Contractual Reliability and Maintainability Requirements? Con-
tractual test provisions? Incentives?
e. Determine the status of type classification and the T&E on which
it was (or will be based).
/. Determine the status of PEP and if preliminary technical data
package (specifications, drawings, test procedures, etc.) is sufficiently
complete, reflects the tested prototype and is adequate as a basis for low
rate initial production.
g. Address those operational (performance band) requirements
which were not proved by the testing program as well as those for which
tests indicated a performance shortfall. These characteristics should be
acknowledged by the user and acceptability of the shortfall certified.
h. Plan to submit Army test results and assessments, in terms c
response to initial questions or issues previously identified, to DDRE fo
evaluation. This will include the results of initial operational tests an
the initial independent evaluation of operational effectiveness and sui<
ability.
t. Assess weapon system configuration to determine if any significant
design changes may be required for full-scale production engineering.
/. Environmental pollution control features have been specifically
evaluated and an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared, if
appropriate.
3. PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT.
Recognizing that significant unknowns can develop during the transi-
tion from development to low rate initial production, the following Pro-
ducibrlity Engineering and Planning (PEP) data should be furnished:
a. Production.
(1) Identify product assurance controls or tests established to pre-
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vent degradation of technical design performance parameters in the
transition from development to low rate initial production.
(2) Outline efforts for minimizing: production risks.
(3) Identify potential production impact on other weapon sys-
tems.
(4) Delineate production and contract options e.g., phase down
plans and work stoppage options, or change production schedules up or
down.
(5) Provide status of pilot production, if appropriate.
(6) Provide a planned production schedule.
(7) Provide the plan and schedules for later test and evaluation
to be accomplished to confirm that the product does, in truth, meet techni-
cal criteria, that the operational test and evaluation findings remain valid,
and that doctrine and tactics for use do optimize mission and force effect-
iveness at least long-term costs.
b. Prodncibility.
(1) Describe production line planning.
(2) Determine that initial facilities surveys have been completed,
include status of accessory and ancillary items; test and training equip-
ment.
c. Procurement.
(1) Identify the criteria for contractor selection. Explain how
the source selection decision took into account the contractor's capability
to produce a necessary defense system on a timely and cost effective basis.
(2) Explain the type of proposed low rate initial production con-
tract with a review of procurement methodology employed by involved
DOD and Army agencies and reasons therefore. Tins review will include a
summary of the procurement review process and bring out these three
points:
(a) Any special provisions such as Total Systems Performance
Responsibility, Escalation, or special funding arrangements with the ra-
tionale for their use.
(6) That the contract, if available, or the Determinations and
Findings (D&F), has been analyzed to insure that the interrelationship of
provisions is understood and that they are compatible with the intent of
the future contract.
(c) That specifications and exhibits to the future contract have
been reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and compatibility in context
with the procurement, and that they are adequate for the intended low
rate initial production.
(3) Describe the size of first low rate initial production buy, basis
for quantity, follow-on quantities, and Government options.
(4) Discuss the principal subsystems which are GFE, CFE : and
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(5) State the actions taken in the RFP to eliminate unnecessary
and marginal performance, management and data requirements. Are there
any reports required by directives or regulations which appear to be
unnecessary?
(G) Describe Value Engineering (VE) provisions to be included in
the contract; estimate costs of these provisions.
Note. Has a current Advance Procurement Plan been submitted to ASD(I«£L)?
(7) Describe configuration management plan and contractor per-
formance measurement with delineated contractor and government re-
sponsibilities and authorities.
4. SCHEDULES.
a. Identify features in the low rate initial production start-up sched-
ule which minimizes financial commitments until all major development
problems and operational issues have been resolved. Appropriate informa-
tion from other DOD agencies involved in developing supporting sub-
systems may be included in ASARC reviews.
b. Depict the status of the pacing and long leadtime items.
c. Identify possible slippage or production risk.
d. Identify those external factors which may effect program, e.g.,
delays in delivery of GFE, labor stoppages, results of DT/OT, etc.
e. Review the concurrency and schedules compressions as they relate
to additional resources and management actions required, and the gains
versus risks.
5. COSTS.
a. Explain fully low rate initial production cost estimates and include:
(1) Comparison of production costs with similar programs and
with approved DCP (DSARC I) projections. Should cost analysis (if
appropriate).
(2) Price out of program alternatives; indicate options to reduce
costs expressed in terms of constant year and then year dollars.
(3) Cost projections including funding requirements by FY.
b. Provide a depiction of cost estimating techniques used and in-
clude
—
(1) OSD/Army estimates, and planned budget.
(2) Projected escalation, system acquisition, life cycle costs, and
logistic support costs.
c. Define management control systems and data costs and the ap-
proximate ratio of these costs to hardware costs.
d. A review of cost history which traces estimates and costing factors
-including those for economic escalation.
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• 6. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
Review the plan for overall program management to determine that
the Army management concept is tailored to program and contract type;
determine compliance with major OSI) guidance, such as, 28 May 1970
memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, and DODD 5000.1.
7. OTHER.
a. Ascertain that the program proposed to go forward is consistent
with the DCP/DPM/APM and its thresholds.
6. Indicate that the next SAR, if required, will be consistent with
DCP with respect to the rationale on which the production decision is
based.
c. Give assurance that an integrated logistic support plan complying
with DODD 4100.35 and DODD 3221.1 has been implemented.
d. Depict configuration control techniques.
e. Describe management systems used to control costs, schedule, and
technical performance; reports required.
/. Discuss the operational, technical, scheduling, costs, procurement,
and program management considerations of indirect or "spillover" effects
of the system.
g. Provide the following information, as appropriate:
(1) Candidate contractors' historical performance record.
(2) Status of candidate contractors' purchasing systems, includ-
ing approval of make or buy plans.
(3) Compliance with provisions of Armed Services Procurement
Regulation and Public Law 87-053.
(4) Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO).
(5) Proprietary Rights Issues.
(6) Political issues and/or special congressional interest.
(7) Description of performance incentive(s) contained in pro-
posed low rate initial production contract.
8. ASARC/DSARC REVIEWS INVOLVING SOURCE SELECTION.
Provide information comparing the proposed programs of unsuccess-
ful bidders with the winning proposal.
9. SECURITY.
Summarize the security classification of the program, system, com-
ponents, technical characteristics and any other aspects of the program
requiring classification.
10. DSARC REVIEWS.
OSD may require special DSARC reviews between Milestones II and
III. This checklist is intended for such reviews and for the ASARC Ha
review for the Army's low rate initial production decision.
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CHECKLIST FOR MILESTONE III REVIEWS
(END OF DEVELOPMENT AND
BEGIN FULL-SCALE PRODUCTION)
Purpose of Milestone III ASARC/DSARC.
The purpose of the Milestone III DSARC review is to develop a recom-
mendation for the Deputy Secretary of Defense on moving a weapon
system into production. This review will form the basis for the decision
to produce the system for deployment. DSARC III meetings will be held
at such time that the Army has determined that
—
a. Engineering and operational systems development and testing, in-
cluding the necessary initial operational testing and evaluation have been
substantially completed and all major development problems have been
resolved.
b. The cost and importance warrant production and deployment of
the system that has been tested, evaluated by trade-off analysis and de-
fined.
c. System definition (specifications, drawings and associate documen-
tation) incorporate the total findings of the development effort and are
adequate for production. Can competition be used for the initial produ
tion contract? If not, why? When is competition for production planned
d. Schedule and cost estimates and commitments are credible ar
acceptable.
e. DCP thresholds are sufficiently defined to ensure identification of
major production program variances.
/. The production plans and personnel and logistics support plans
are acceptable.
g. Sufficient progress has been made toward a negotiated contract
to justify transition to the Production Phase.
h. Contractual conditions are sound.
t. Analyses (trade-off, parametric cost, cost and effectiveness sup-
ported test data) are adequate to confirm there is a need for producing
the defense system in consideration of threat, estimated acquisition
and ownership costs and potential benefits in context with overall Army
strategy and fiscal guidance.
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j. Test data and analyses exist to assure that all previously identified
technical uncertainties have been resolved.
k. Threat is still credible (conforms with the AAI or has been coor-
dinated with ACSI).
I. If a competitive program is being addressed, a clear winner has been
established.
n. Initial issue quantity requirements for major systems will be dis-
played by projection of the BOIP in the Structure and Composition Sys-
tem (SACS).
1. BACKGROUND.
a. Review -program objectives including:
(1) Significant program changes that occurred during development
of the original DCP (DSARC I) program goals.
(2) Description of the original program goals (life cycle costs,
schedule, and performance) compared with current expectations, to in-
clude how well the "design-to" estimates were met.
b. Provide brief summary of the operational need and mission re-
quirements, as reflected in the ROC, including:
(1) Concept analysis.
(2) Cost-benefit trade-off analysis.
(3) Current and anticipated threat—if a range exists in the intelli-
gence community, provide it.
(4) Related tactics and doctrine.
(5) Reasons for requiring a new system, including operation and
support personnel costs as well as materiel costs and technical compari-
sons with systems to be replaced or supplemented.
2. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT.
a. Status of development. Review the status of weapon system and
the major subsystems and components to
—
(1) Assure that necessary preproduction prototype testing to in-
clude operational testing is completed or pilot production technical and
operational testing is completed, both to assure the meeting of specified
technical criteria and those necessary to estimate operational effective-
ness, suitability (including reliability, maintainability and training re-
quirements), and optimization of tactics. Assure that testing validates
the BOI and confirms compatibility with other systems and equipment it
will operate with in the field.
(2) Establish that all the design and performance band achieve-
ment milestones (prerequisites to production) have been achieved, and all
major problems resolved or appropriate trade-offs made.
(3) Contractual Reliability and Maintainability requirements?
Contractual test provisions? Incentives?
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criteria, that the initial operational test and evaluation findings remain
valid, and that doctrine and tactics for use do optimize mission effective-
ness at least long-term costs. Assure that testing validates the BOI and
confirms the compatibility of the system with other systems and equip-
ment it must operate within the field.
b. Producibility.
(1) Describe the readiness of the production line.
(2) Determine that facilities surveys have been completed, include
status of accessory and ancillary items; test and training equipment.
c. Procurement.
(1) Identify the criteria for contractor selection. Explain how the
source selection decision took into account the contractor's capability to
produce a necessary defense system on a timely and cost effective basis.
(2) Explain the type of proposed production contract with a re-
view of procurement methodology and reasons therefore. This review will
include a summary of the procurement review process and bring out
these three points:
(a) Any special provisions such as total systems performance re-
sponsibility, escalation, or special funding arrangements with the rationale
for their use.
(6) That the contract has been analyzed to insure that the inter-
relationship of provisions is understood and that they are compatible with
the intent of the contract.
(c) That specifications and exhibits to the contract have been
reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and compatibility in context with
the procurement, and that they are adequate for the intended production.
(3) Describe the size of first production buy, basis for quantity,
follow-on quantities, and Government options.
(4) Discuss the principal subsystem which are GFE, CFE: and
why; provide an evaluation of the vendor's capability to produce these
items.
(5) State the actions taken in the RFP to eliminate unnecessary
and marginal performance, management and data requirements. Are there
any reports required by directives or regulations which appear to be un-
necessary ?
(6) Provide environmental impact statements (EIS) for each
procurement alternative, if appropriate.
(7) Describe Value Engineering (YE) provisions to be included in
the contract; estimate costs of these provisions.
Note. Has a current Advance Procurement Plan been submitted to ASD(I&L)?
(8) Describe configuration management plan with delineated con-
tractor government responsibilities and authorities.
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criteria, that the initial operational test and evaluation findings remain
valid, and that doctrine and tactics for use do optimize mission effective-
ness at least long-term costs. Assure that testing validates the BOI and
confirms the compatibility of the system with other systems and equip-
ment it must operate within the field.
b. Producibility.
(1) Describe the readiness of the production line.
(2) Determine that facilities surveys have been completed, include
status of accessory and ancillary items; test and training- equipment.
c. Procurement.
(1) Identify the criteria for contractor selection. Explain how the
source selection decision took into account the contractor's capability to
produce a necessary defense system on a timely and cost effective basis.
(2) Explain the type of proposed production contract with a re-
view of procurement methodology and reasons therefore. This review will
include a summary of the procurement review process and bring out
these three points:
(a) Any special provisions such as total systems performance re-
sponsibility, escalation, or special funding arrangements with the rationale
for their use.
(b) That the contract has been analyzed to insure that the inter-
relationship of provisions is understood and that they are compatible with
the intent of the contract.
(c) That specifications and exhibits to the contract have been
reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and compatibility in context with
the procurement, and that they are adequate for the intended production.
(3) Describe the size of first production buy, basis for quantity,
follow-on quantities, and Government options.
(4) Discuss the principal subsystem which are GFE, CFE: and
why; provide an evaluation of the vendor's capability to produce these
items.
(5) State the actions taken in the RFP to eliminate unnecessary
and marginal performance, management and data requirements. Are there
any reports required by directives or regulations which appear to be un-
necessary?
(6) Provide environmental impact statements (EIS) for each
procurement alternative, if appropriate.
(7) Describe Value Engineering (YE) provisions to be included in
the contract ; estimate costs of these provisions.
Note. Has a current Advance Procurement Plan been submitted to ASD(I&L)?
(8) Describe configuration management plan with delineated con-
tractor government responsibilities and authorities.
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4. SCHEDULES.
a. Identify features in the production start-up schedule which mini-
mize financial commitments until all major development problems and
operational issues have been resolved.
6. Depict the status of the pacing items.
c. Identify possible slippage.
d. Identify those external factors which may effect program, e.g.,
delays in delivery of GFE, labor stoppages, etc.
e. Review the concurrency and schedules compression as they relate
to additional resources and management actions required, and the gains
versus risks.
5. COSTS.
a. Explain fully production cost estimates and include:
(1) Comparison of production costs with similar programs and
with approved DCP (DSARC I) projections. Should cost analysis if ap-
propriate.
(2) Price out of program alternatives; indicate options to reduce
costs, expressed in terms of constant year and then year dollars.
(3) Cost projections including funding requirements by FY.
b. Provide a depiction of cost estimating techniques used and in-
clude:
(1) OSD/Army estimates, contractor's estimate, and planned bud-
get.
(2) Projected escalation, system acquisition, life cycle costs, and
logistic support costs.
c. Define data costs and the approximate ratio of data costs to hard-
ware costs.
d. A review of cost history which traces estimates and costing factors
including those for economic escalation.
6. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
Review the plan for overall program management to determine that
the Army management concept is tailored to program and contract type;
determine compliance with major OSD guidance, such as, 28 May 1970
memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, and DODD 5000.1.
7. OTHER.
a. Ascertain that the program proposed to go forward is consistent
with the DCP/DPM APM and its thresholds.
6. Indicate that the SAR is consistent with DCP with respect to the
rationale on which the production decision is based.
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c. Give assurance that an integrated logistic support plan complying
with DODD 4100.35 and DODD 3224.1 has been implemented.
d. Depict configuration control techniques.
e. Describe management systems used to control costs, schedule, and
technical performance; reports required.
/. Discuss the operational, technical, scheduling, costs, procurement
and program management considerations of indirect or "spillover" effects
of the system.
g. Provide the following information, as appropriate:
(1) Contractor's historical performance record.
(2) Status of contractor's purchasing system, including approval
of make or buy plans.
(3) Compliance with provisions of Armed Services Procurement
Regulation and Public Law 87-653.
(4) Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO).
(5) Proprietary Rights Issues.
(6) Political issues and/or special congressional interest.
(7) Description of performance incentive(s) contained in con-
tract.
8. ASARC/DSARC REVIEWS INVOLVING SOURCE SELECTION.
Provide information comparing the proposed programs of unsuccess-
ful bidders with the winning proposal.
9. SECURITY.
Summarize the security classification of the program, system, com-




yThe proponent ogency of this regulation is the Office of the Chief of Staff.
Users are invited to send comments and sugqested improvements on
DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) direct to HQDA
(DACS-CWA) WASH DC 20310.




Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General
CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
DISTRIBUTION:
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-9 requirements for AR Boards, Commis-
sions and Committees:
Active Army: D (Qty rqr block no. 23).
ARNG: None.
USAR: D (Qty rqr block no. 23).




1. Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
,
DOD Directive
5000.1, 13 July 1971.
2. Acquisition of Major Weapons Systems, R eport to the
Congress by the Comptroller General of the United
State s, 18 March 19 71.
3. Acquisition of Major Weapons Systems, Report to the
Congress by the Com ptrol ler General of the United
States (Draft Copy), 29 March 1972.




5 • American Defense Policy
,
2nd ed., pp. 405-414, John
Hopkins Press, 1968.
6 • A Modern Design for Defense Decision, a McNamara-
Hit ch-En thoven Anthol ogy
,
Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, 1966.
7. Basic Policies for System Acquisition
,
Army Regula-
tion 1000-1, 30 June 1972.
8. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of
Defens e, July 1970.
9
.
Defense S ystems Acquisition Review Council Presenta -
tions , 0PNAV~fnstruction 5000.41, 15 December 1972.
1 . Department of the Navy Programming Manual , Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1971.
11
.
Department of the Navy RDT & E Management Guide
,
Part I: System Description, NAVSO P-2457 (REV. 7-72),
Government Printing Office, 1972.
12. de Poix, Vice Admiral V. P., "Concepts for Improving
Defense Management," Defense Management Journal ,
v. VII , no. 1, pp. 36-40, Spring 1971.
1 3 DSARC Reviews Contain in g Source Selection Informa -
tion Brief ing , Memorandum for Secretaries of the





Establishment of a Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council
,
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments and Others from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, 30 May 1969.
15. "Farewell" Report of Former Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard on Defense Management Problems, 1972.
1 6 Final Report of the USAF Academy Risk Analysis Study
Team
,
Colorado, 1 August 1971.




18. Garvis, V., "Contractor Proposal Evaluation Process
Defined by AMC," Defense Industry Bulletin
,
August 1969.
19. Kline, M. B., Integrated Logistic Sup port, notes pre-
pared for the UCLA Short Course, September 1970.
20. Koontz, H . and O'Donnell, C., Principles of Management :





Hill Book Company, 1968.
21. Logistics Management Institute Task 69-28, Introductio n
to Military Project Management , March 19 71.
22. Naval M aterial Command DSARC Review Group
,
NAVMAT
Notice 5000, 10 January 1973.
2 3 . Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions
,
DOD Directive 7000.2, 25 April 1972.
2 A . Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition,
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments
and Others from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
2 8 May 1970.
2 5 Public Expen ditures and Policy Analysis
,
pp. 485-501,
Markham Publishing Company, 1971.
26. Reich, Vice Admiral E. T., "The Challenge of Cost-to




pp. 6-10, April 1972.
27. Rushing, Captain C. F., "The Department of the Navy
and DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS)," Armed Forces Comptroller
,




28. Srull, D. W., "Parametric Cost Estimating Aids DOD in
Systems Acquisition," Defense Management Journal
,
v. i
no. 1, pp. 2-5, April 1972.
29. System Acquisition in the Department of the Navy
,






1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Dr. J. R. Borsting 1




4. Professor Melvin B. Kline 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939 4
5. Professor M.G. Sovereign 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman III 1




7. Mr. E. J. Nucci 1
Office of the Secretary of Defense (DDR&E)
Washington, D. C. 20301
8. Mr. John Tyler 1
DACS - CWA
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310
9. LCOL C. W. Hall, USAF 1
AF/LGS
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330
10. Lieutenant Commander W. P. Bancroft 2





11. Lieutenant Commander Timothy S. Brady
USS Benjamin Franklin (SSBN 640) (Blue)
Fleet Post Office






l I I '
"
i — "
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R&D
Security c las si lie *lion ot title, body ul abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overnll report /> classified)
iiTINC ACTIVITY (Corpora re author)
ial Postgraduate School
)terey, California 93940




Preparation for the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council
C PTivE NOTES (Type vl report end.inclus ive dates)
;er's Thesis, March 1973
hRisi (First name, middle initial, last name)
Lothy S. Brady and William P. Bancroft
5T O A TE
h 19 7 3
7a. TOTAL NO. OF PACES
187
76. NO. OF REFS
29
<q*CT OR GRANT NO. fia. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBERUl
86. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other number r that may be aealgned
thlt report)
1IBUTION STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
.EMEN T AR Y NOTES 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
The purpose of this thesis is t
guid e for the project manag er , t o b
tion of the Defense Systems Acquis i
(DSARC) presentation. The authors
whic h relate to the non-technic al a
tion because they believe knowledge
tics will substantially aid the pro
considerations which comprise the f
are also included, but only from a
fie detail was avoided because each
its own areas of emphasis. Theref o
that a discussion and compi lat ion o
technical factors, which th is thes i
provide the project manager a base





spe c t s o
of thes













f the presen ta-
e characteris-
ager. Technical






























nJ reparaUon f°r the
^
















2a 7 2 6









Preparation for the Defense Systems Acqu
3 2768 002 07172 2
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
